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Caveat Emptor: Lessons from the Eisenhower Presidency 
A Comprehensive Overview of the Politics of Judicial 
Appointments and Ike’s Three “Biggest Damn-Fooled Mistakes” 
Zachary Kaufman  
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This project looks into one of the most profoundly important 
aspects of a president’s job, namely, making appointments to the 
Supreme Court. Article II of the Constitution tasks the president with 
appointing justices to the Supreme Court, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, but gives little further instruction as to what that 
might entail. Over time, both the executive and legislative branches have 
forged their own paths in what has become a fairly complex and 
extraconstitutional governmental process. By shedding light on the 
factors that presidents take into account when making such 
nominations, this paper seeks to examine what can happen when part of 
that process goes awry, specifically, by looking at President 
Eisenhower’s three botched appointments of Justices Warren, Brennan, 
and Whittaker. In Eisenhower’s view, two of the three were viewed as 
political or ideological mistakes, and the third has widely been regarded 
as a failure by historians and scholars of the Court for other reasons. 
This thesis delves into the stories surrounding these three 
appointments, with the intent of extrapolating how the appointments 
came to be. It examines the roles of Eisenhower and his Attorney 
General, Herbert Brownell, and seeks to analyze the decision-making 
style of the Eisenhower administration and learn how, if at all, 
Eisenhower’s military experience may have contributed to his “three 
greatest mistakes.” 
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The Politics of Judicial Appointments 
I. Introduction 
The president of the United States has often been referred to as “the most 
powerful man in the world.” He is the commander-in-chief, head of state, leader of 
his political party, public opinion molder, legislative agenda setter, and so much 
more. One of his more significant powers as president, though, is the selection and 
appointment of justices to the Supreme Court. The reason that this particular 
decision is so vitally important is because a justice, once confirmed by the Senate, 
sits on the Supreme Court for a life term, which for some, has lasted for thirty years 
or more. Consequently, when a president has the opportunity to make an 
appointment to the Supreme Court, he is potentially making a decision that will 
affect the laws and policies of the United States for decades. For some presidents, 
however, appointments to the Supreme Court have been considered as major 
regrets or mistakes. There is no one for whom this holds truer than for President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower.  
 Over the course of his presidency, Eisenhower made five appointments to the 
Supreme Court. Of these five, arguably, three were major blunders. But how did one 
of the most important decisions and responsibilities that a president is faced with 
get so bungled, not once, not twice, but three times? Over the course of this paper, I 
will seek to answer this mystifying question by looking carefully at the deliberative 
selection processes of the Eisenhower Administration with respect to the 
nominations of Earl Warren, William J. Brennan, Jr., and Charles Evans Whittaker to 
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the Supreme Court, in order to determine what was the central cause behind these 
apparent colossal mishaps.  
Two of the three, Warren and Brennan, had ideologies and voting records on 
the High Court that contrasted rather sharply with that of their nominator, and the 
third, Whittaker, suffered a serious mental breakdown from the pressures that came 
with the job and resigned after a few short years. Did Eisenhower expect this kind of 
behavior from these justices when he appointed them? What was he thinking when 
he nominated them to the Court? Were these mistakes the result of poor vetting on 
the part of the president and his advisers or was it something else? How could such 
an effective administrator as Eisenhower botch such a pivotal decision no less than 
three times? Were the nominations of Warren, Brennan, and Whittaker really the 
“mistakes” that Eisenhower and his advisers claimed that they were? All of these 
mystifying quandaries will be addressed over the course of this comprehensive 
examination of the intricate and vitally important presidential task of selecting and 
appointing members to the Supreme Court of the United States. As we shall see, the 
answer to these questions ultimately reside in the type of man that Eisenhower was, 
the life experiences that informed the type of president that he would become, and 
the political climate he presided over.    
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II. Constitutional Origins 
 Before we can begin to understand what went so painfully wrong for 
Eisenhower, it is necessary first to understand the origins of the process for 
appointing Supreme Court justices. Much as for everything else in American 
government, the Constitution remains the best place to begin to understand the 
basic structure and processes. On the question of who should nominate justices to 
the Supreme Court, Article II, Section Two simply reads: “and he [the President] 
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall 
appoint…judges of the Supreme Court.” 1  No requirements for the office are 
presented; not age (as with the President and Congress), not even prior legal 
training.  
Selecting justices had proved to be just one of many points of contention 
amongst the delegates tasked with revamping the failed Articles of Confederation. 
Perhaps the fact that thirty-four of the fifty-five delegates assembled in Philadelphia 
in the summer of 1787 for the Second Constitutional Convention were lawyers, led 
to a divergence of opinion as to what role the federal judiciary ought to hold in the 
new government and how its members ought to be selected.2 History has provided 
us with several examples, Bush v. Gore probably being the most famous, of why the 
appointment process is such a serious one. Certain decisions handed down by the 
Supreme Court have arguably been decided along partisan lines, and so who in 
government enjoys the power of placing members on the High Court has proven to 
                                                        
1 U.S. Constitution. Art. II, sec. 2, cl. 2. 
2 Lee Epstein and Jeffrey A. Segal, Advice and Consent: The Politics of Judicial Appointments (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2005) 9. 
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be of great consequence. But how did the delegates come to decide on the language 
we see today in the Constitution? 
 The delegates spent the better part of twelve days, spread over June, July, 
August, and September of 1787, at the Constitutional Convention trying to find a 
solution for how federal judges should be appointed.3  The central issue that 
inspired the most intensive debate concerned the degree of power that was to be 
vested in the executive and the extent to which the legislative branch, by way of the 
Senate, would participate in the process. Some ideas that were proposed included 
judicial selection by an executive elected by the legislature (William Paterson’s 
“New Jersey Plan”), thereby conferring the Senate with exclusive power to appoint 
judges, and James Madison’s proposal of appointment by the president subject to 
two-thirds of the Senate’s disapproval.4 Many of the delegates, such as John 
Rutledge of South Carolina, having just fought a bitter war to overthrow King 
George, were fearful of placing such an important power in the hands of a 
”monarchical” executive.5 These fears seemed to have been allayed with the 
proposal of having the responsibility shared with the upper house of the legislature, 
and it was ultimately agreed that the Congress should be given a role in the judicial 
appointment process. Much debate ensued, though, as to the actual extent of 
legislative participation.  
The records of the Constitutional Convention are not wholly adequate due to 
the desire of the delegates to have the proceedings held in secret; the controversial 
                                                        
3 Henry J. Abraham, Justices and Presidents (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985) 25.  
4 David Alistair Yalof, Pursuit of Justices (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999) 8. 
5 Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1911) 119. 
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nature of their business dictated that secrecy would be of paramount importance. 
Nonetheless, William Jackson, the appointed Secretary of the Convention, was 
tasked with recording the minutes of the Constitution, and other individual 
members recorded the details of the proceedings on their own. Accordingly, we 
have a somewhat cogent idea of what transpired at the Convention and what led to 
the finished product we have today. 
At the Constitutional Convention, delegates debated for months, often with 
very little progress, as to where the power to appoint justices to the judiciary ought 
to reside. There were three primary viewpoints at the convention concerning the 
proper degree of legislative participation in the judicial appointment process. 
Charles Pinckney of South Carolina, Roger Sherman of Connecticut, and William 
Paterson of New Jersey were all of the opinion that the bulk of the responsibility of 
appointing members to the “Supreme Tribunal” ought to reside with the Congress.6 
They believed that this would lead to a judiciary that was representative of all the 
diverse geographic regions of the country.  
James Wilson, one of the most influential delegates at the Convention, 
wholeheartedly disagreed. Wilson, a delegate from Pennsylvania and a future 
Supreme Court Justice, was an outspoken critic of giving the entire Congress such a 
powerful voice in the process. According to Madison’s notes from the Convention, 
Wilson thought that delegating much of the responsibility to both bodies of 
Congress would lead to “intrigue, partiality, and concealment.”7 Wilson believed that 
vesting such a powerful decision in the hands of Congress, an institution that was 
                                                        
6 Farrand 121.  
7 Farrand 119. 
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expected to be partisan and highly political, was not an appropriate mechanism for 
selecting justices to what was supposed to be an independent Court, not beholden to 
political majorities.  
James Madison concurred that the proposal to have justices selected by 
Congress was problematic, but he preferred a different solution. In his view, “[m]any 
of them [members of Congress] were incompetent judges of the requisite 
qualifications…they were too much influenced by their partialities.”8 According to 
his own personal records, Madison feared the possibility that a judge who “had 
displayed a talent for business in the legislative field, who had perhaps assisted 
ignorant members in business of their own, or of their Constituents, or used other 
winning means, would without any of the essential qualifications for an expositor of 
the laws prevail over a competitor not having these recommendations but 
possessed of every necessary accomplishment.”9 Instead, Madison argued that the 
power to appoint should be given only to the Senate, the more select and less 
numerous body, which could evaluate candidates more competently than the 
House.10   
Ultimately, it was Nathaniel Gorham, a delegate from Massachusetts, who 
proposed the system we have in place today. Gorham argued that the appointment 
process for federal judges should be modeled after the appointment process used in 
Massachusetts, which entailed a nomination by the executive and subsequent 
                                                        
8 Farrand 232. 
9 Farrand 232. 
10 William G. Ross, The Functions, Roles, and Duties of the Senate in the Supreme Court Appointment 
Process, 28 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 633 (1986) 
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approval by the Senate.11 Gorham argued that the Senate was “too numerous, and 
too little personally responsible, to ensure a good choice.”12 On the other hand, 
according to Gorham, the executive “would certainly be more answerable for a good 
appointment, as the whole blame for a bad one would fall on him alone.”13 Thus, 
motivated by the system already in place in his home state of Massachusetts, 
Gorham proposed that the executive would appoint justices, by and with the advice 
and consent of the Senate. Initially, the delegates failed to pass Gorham’s proposal 
and the debate raged on for a number of weeks without resolution. It was not until 
the Special Committee on Postponed Matters recommended appointment by the 
executive with the advice and consent of the Senate that the delegates finally 
adopted the proposal, interestingly, without much fanfare or dissent.14 
 Although it had been definitively codified in the Constitution that the 
President and the Senate would jointly share the responsibility of appointing 
justices to the Supreme Court, there was still a considerable amount of confusion 
concerning the Framers’ intent for the Senate’s actual participation in the process. 
While the delegates had finally come to agreement on the wording of the 
appointment clause, there was not much discussion as to how the proposal would 
be carried out in practice. On one side stood those who favored an expansive role for 
the Senate, in which it would have the right or responsibility to reject a president’s 
unqualified or otherwise undeserving nominees. That the delegates ultimately 
                                                        
11 “Constitutional Origins of the Federal Judiciary”, Federal Judicial Center, at 
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/index.html (Date Visited: 14 October 2012)  
12 Ross. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
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endorsed the idea of “advice and consent” suggests that the Framers thought it 
imperative that the Senate be included in the process and that they did not envision 
a passive role for the Senate. On the other hand, some delegates, believed in a much 
more limited role for the Senate with respect to making judicial appointments. 
Articulating this viewpoint in Federalist #76, Hamilton wrote, 
[i]t is not very probable that his (the president’s) 
nomination would often be overruled. The Senate could 
not be tempted, by the preference they might feel to 
another, to reject the one proposed; because they could 
not assure themselves, that the person they might wish be 
brought forward by a second or by any subsequent 
nomination. They could not even be certain, that a future 
nomination would present a candidate in any degree more 
acceptable to them…15 
 
Since the Senate had no way of ensuring that its preferred nominee would ever be 
selected by the president in the event that it was to reject his choice, there would be 
no real purpose for the Senate to invoke its veto power with respect to judicial 
appointees. Instead, Hamilton saw the Senate’s role in the judicial selection process 
to serve as nothing more than a “silent operation,” in which the president would be 
forced to choose a truly proper nominee, lest he suffer rejection in the Senate.16 
Ultimately, that the appointment clause appears in Article II with the powers of the 
executive, as opposed to Article I, which lists the powers delegated to the legislature, 
                                                        
15 Alexander Hamilton, “Federalist #76,” in The Federalist Papers, para. 7. At 
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fed_76.html  
16 Epstein and Segal 19. 
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serves to indicate that the Framers wanted the bulk of the responsibility to reside 
with the President as opposed to the Senate.17  
One final thing to consider with respect to the concept of “advice and 
consent” might be the degree to which the Senate truly ought to exercise this duty. 
Some scholars have raised the issue that the Senate should be more aggressive with 
respect to judicial appointments than for other types of presidential appointments. 
For as Robert Dahl has noted, since the President and the Senate, in their respective 
roles in the judicial appointment process, serve as the only check on an otherwise 
independent judiciary, perhaps the nomination of a judge deserves more scrutiny by 
the Senate than, say, an ordinary cabinet appointment.18 After all, the cabinet 
members report to the president and assist him with the management of his 
administration, and thus, he should be able to name his team, subject only to broad 
limitations. Over the years, the Senate has reacted to this question by crafting its 
own unique niche in the complex process of judicial appointments, in which its role 
greatly exceeds the narrow confines of “advice and consent” as established by the 
Framers in the Constitution. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
17 Epstein and Segal 18. 
18 Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 
Journal of Public Law 6 (1957) pp. 279-295 
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Part III – Extraconstitutional Considerations   
Nowadays, most of the ritual for nominations to the Supreme Court is 
extraconstitutional, or beyond the prescriptions provided by the Constitution. The 
reason that this is so is probably because the Constitution offered no real detailed 
methodology for how presidents should select nominees and how the Senate was 
meant to exercise its “advise and consent” role. Consequently, over time, the 
executive and the Senate have come up with their own processes that, by and large, 
have endured until today. Generally speaking, the Senate enjoys a greater role in the 
process than was probably originally intended by the Framers. While the president 
is widely seen as having broad discretion in nominating the justices of his choosing, 
the Senate has assumed a more active role by way of the Senate Judiciary Committee 
and more recently, by preventing nominations from coming to a vote on the Senate 
floor, on one occasion, via the procedural barrier known as the filibuster. 
The committee structure of Congress that is widely believed to be a more 
efficient and productive way for it to handle its business, is not found anywhere in 
the Constitution. To be sure, though, the Constitution did allow the bodies of 
Congress to devise their own bylaws governing procedure and structure within each 
respective house, for as Article I, Section V, Cl. 2 of the U.S. Constitution simply 
states, “[e]ach House may determine the rules of its proceedings.”19 Most of the rules 
have been codified over centuries in what has become known merely as “House 
                                                        
19 U.S. Constitution, Art. I, sec. 5, cl. 2 
 14 
Rules” and “Standing Rules of the Senate.”20  While the committee structure utilized 
by Congress has been around since the founding, albeit on a smaller scale, the 
number of committees in Congress exploded around the time of the Civil War, as a 
result of massive population increases and economic growth.21 As more and more 
areas came under the purview of Congress, the use of committees was seen as a way 
to boost efficiency and allow for increased specialization. Although the Senate 
Judiciary Committee had been created as a standing committee in 1813, it was not 
until the latter half of the nineteenth century that the committee pursued a more 
active role in the judicial appointment process.22 
Over the past two centuries, the Senate failed to confirm twenty-seven of the 
one hundred forty seven nominees to the Supreme Court; twelve were rejected 
outright and another fifteen were defeated by inaction on the part of the Senate.23 
Whereas many Americans tend to view the botched Bork nomination of the 1980’s 
as an anomaly in which the Senate lashed out against a high-profile conservative 
nominee, in fact, the Senate had been rejecting nominees since the founding. Indeed, 
the Senate rejected two otherwise highly qualified Supreme Court nominees as early 
as 1795 and 1811, when the Senate, for seemingly political and ideological reasons, 
                                                        
20United States Senate, Senate Rules and Administration Committee at 
http://www.senate.gov/reference/reference_index_subjects/Rules_and_Procedure_vrd.htm.  
21 Michael Welsh, An Overview of the Development of U.S. Congressional Committees (2008) at 
http://www.llsdc.org/attachments/wysiwyg/544/Cong-Cmte-Overview.pdf.  
22 Ibid. 
23 Epstein and Segal 20. 
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rejected John Rutledge, a Washington appointee, and Alexander Walcott, a Madison 
appointee, respectively.24  
Washington initially appointed Rutledge as Associate Justice in 1791. He 
greatly admired Rutledge, whom he referred to as the “man who wrote the 
Constitution,” and wanted to appoint him as Chief Justice but instead opted for John 
Jay, in an honorable gesture to New York for playing a decisive role in the 
ratification process.25 After several months, Rutledge resigned and assumed the 
position of Chief Justice of South Carolina, his home state. When Chief Justice Jay 
resigned in 1795 to run for governor of New York, Washington sought to re-
nominate Rutledge to replace him. Rutledge became the second Chief Justice to take 
to the bench as a recess appointment, a post he held for about four months. When 
the Senate reconvened in December, 1795, it voted to oust Rutledge by a vote of 
10:14, the only Justice on record among the fifteen who functioned as recess 
appointments, who was not subsequently confirmed by the Senate. Although several 
theories abound as the why the Senate rejected Rutledge, there is a consensus that 
the Senate tossed out the recess appointment due to Rutledge’s outspoken 
opposition to the Jay Treaty, which had been popular in the Senate and which it 
proceeded to ratify within months.26   
Several years later, in 1811, the Senate rejected Madison’s appointment of 
Alexander Wolcott to fill the seat of Justice Samuel Chase, by a vote of 9:24, the 
                                                        
24 John S. Goff, The Rejection of United States Supreme Court Appointments, American Journal of 
Legal History, Vol. 5, No. 4, (Oct. 1961) pp. 357-368. 
25 Abraham 73. 
26 Ibid. 
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largest margin of defeat for a Supreme Court justice to date.27 Wolcott, a Democrat-
Republican like Madison, was very unpopular in the Senate due to his previous 
position as U.S. Collector of Customs.28 Wolcott’s strong enforcement of the 
controversial Embargo and Non-Intercourse Acts, combined with his lack of judicial 
experience, led to his defeat. 
 Hence, the history of an active role for the Senate in confirming or rejecting 
presidential nominees to the Supreme Court has an early origin. Then-Senator Joe 
Biden, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee from 1987 to 1995, expressed 
this sentiment during the spirited Bork confirmation hearings, when he was accused 
of leading an unprecedented challenge against the Reagan nominee. In his 
disagreement with the claim that the Senate ought to have a small role in the 
process, Biden pointedly argued,  
[I]t appears that some of those who are advocating the 
voicing of concern for judicial independence here really 
mean a judicial appointment process that is 
independen[t] of the Senate. They seem to suggest that 
the Senate should play no role in determining who sits 
on the Court. That advice and consent, they seem to be 
saying, is fine so long as the Senate always agrees and 
consents to the President's first choice. Mr. President, 
that is not our Constitution, and that is not our 
history…29 
 
To be sure, though, the Senate has not always been aggressive in its role of “advice 
and consent.” Nonetheless, it is clear that the idea of an only recently active role for 
                                                        
27 Abraham 88. 
28 Henry B. Hogue, Supreme Court Nominations Not Confirmed, 1789-2007 (Congressional Research 
Service, 2008) at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31171.pdf.  
29 Scott R. Ryther, Advice and Consent: The Senate’s Political Role in the Supreme Court Appointment 
Process (Utah Law Review: 1988) pp. 411-433. 
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the Senate in the judicial appointment process is merely myth and nothing more, 
although the techniques used by the Senate have certainly evolved over time.  
 Broadly speaking, the means by which the Senate has gotten involved in the 
process of judicial appointments have been through the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
the use of filibusters and preventing floor votes on a particular nominee, and the 
norm of senatorial courtesy (typically invoked, though, regarding appointments to 
lower federal courts). It is virtually impossible for the Senate to vote on a nominee 
without a favorable recommendation from the Senate Judiciary Committee.30 When 
a president makes a nomination, generally the committee will schedule 
confirmation hearings at which its members will subject the nominee to a litany of 
questions pertaining to credentials, jurisprudence, legal theory, and his or her views 
on various political issues. The committee will then either approve a nominee, 
paving the way for consideration by the whole body, or reject a nominee, essentially 
ensuring the candidate and the president certain defeat. However, a third option 
exists whereby the chairman of the committee does not schedule confirmation 
hearings, effectively killing the nomination before the nominee “gets his day in 
court.” Take, for example, the 1990’s, when the Senate Judiciary Committee granted 
hearings to ninety percent of President Clinton’s circuit court nominees when the 
Senate was under Democratic control. That figure dropped to 74%, then 79%, and 
finally 47% in the Republican-led sessions of 1995-96, 1997-98, and 1999-2000, 
respectively.31  The Senate has used this strategy more often with respect to lower 
courts than with the Supreme Court, but it is clear that the Senate has used the 
                                                        
30 Epstein and Segal 25. 
31 Ibid. 
 18 
Senate Judiciary Committee to guarantee itself a say in the judicial appointment 
process with great efficacy.  
 The Senate has also utilized the infamous filibuster at least on one occasion in 
recent history to block a nominee from coming to a floor vote. In 1968, when it 
became clear that Richard Nixon would win the presidential election, a coalition of 
Southern Democrats in the Senate utilized the filibuster to prevent President 
Johnson from seeking to elevate his close friend, Justice Abe Fortas, to the position 
of Chief Justice.32  The filibuster was successful, Fortas’s confirmation was never 
brought to a floor vote, Nixon won the election, and a more judicially conservative 
Warren Burger became the fifteenth Chief Justice of the United States.  
 The norm of senatorial courtesy has generally only been used with respect to 
judicial appointments to federal circuit and district courts, whereby if the two 
senators (or the senior senator of the president’s party) from the home state of the 
appointee oppose the nomination, the chances of confirmation are next to nil. On 
several rare occasions, though, Senators trying to block Supreme Court nominees 
have invoked senatorial courtesy. In 1844, Reuben Walworth of New York, a Tyler 
(Whig) nominee, was rejected after both Democratic Senators from New York 
opposed the nomination, likely due to the lack of support Tyler engendered among 
congressional Democrats. Again, in 1845, George Woodward of Pennsylvania, a Polk 
(Democrat) nominee, was rejected after the Democratic Senator from Pennsylvania 
declared his fellow Pennsylvanian “personally objectionable,” probably due to 
Woodward’s outspoken nativist tendencies and his role in the 1837 Pennsylvania 
                                                        
32 Epstein and Segal 25. 
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Constitutional Convention.33 At the convention, Woodward took a controversial 
hardline stance on restricting voting rights and the ability for foreigners to hold 
government office.34  In both instances, an age-old customary practice in the Senate 
was employed to deny the president his nominee to the Supreme Court. In any 
event, it is quite clear that with respect to the judicial appointment process, the 
Senate has crafted a larger role for itself, primarily through extraconstitutional 
means, than the simple constitutional prescription for “advice and consent” allowed. 
 Any discussion of the extraconstitutional aspects of the judicial appointment 
process would be incomplete without, at least, a passing mention of the increasingly 
large role occupied by the media and interest groups. Until the early- to mid-
twentieth century, the nomination process largely took place behind closed doors, 
far away from the prying eyes of the media and the public. Confirmation hearings 
were not open to the public until 1916, when the Senate was considering Louis 
Brandeis, and only in 1955 did the bulk of all Supreme Court confirmation hearings 
begin to take place before the Senate Judiciary Committee, which only started to 
televise its hearings in 1981.35 This gradual process has led to a heightened interest 
from the public with respect to the confirmation of Supreme Court nominees. 
Accordingly, the media have made it their business to provide coverage of the 
proceedings, while also over time becoming part of the process themselves, by 
helping to unearth controversies that might otherwise have gone unnoticed. 
                                                        
33 Abraham 28. 
34 Daniel J. Curran, Polk, Politics, and Patronage: The Rejection of George W. Woodward’s 
Nomination to the Supreme Court, The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. 121, No. 
3 (July 1997), pp. 163-199.  
35 Yalof 14.  
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 Coinciding with the heightened public interest in the Supreme Court 
appointment process has been the rise in power of the organized bar and greater 
participation in the process by interest groups. In 1947, the American Bar 
Association’s Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary was founded “to promote 
the nomination of competent persons and to oppose the nomination of unfit 
persons.”36 With different administrations giving larger and smaller roles to the ABA, 
the group generally gave ratings to each of the nominees put forward by the 
president, and naturally, the nominees with favorable ratings would sail through 
confirmation hearings and those with less than favorable ratings encountered a 
more difficult path. Beginning in 1954 with Eisenhower’s nomination of Justice 
Harlan, the ABA has formally reviewed all Supreme Court nominees for the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, enjoying an effective veto power over any nominee it 
disliked—something that the Framers certainly did not envision.37 
  In March, 2001, though, President George W. Bush announced that his 
administration would no longer allow the ABA to prescreen judicial candidates 
before their nominations are made public and forwarded to the Senate. The Bush 
administration believed that given the ABA’s propensity to take public positions on 
“divisive political, legal, and social issues that come before the court,” it was 
“particularly inappropriate” to allow the ABA to have a “quasi-official role” in 
judicial evaluation.”38 While some have argued that the Bush administration cut the 
ABA loose merely because it took the wrong public positions on issues that came 
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before the court, it was entirely within Bush’s prerogative to end the ABA’s 
prescreening of judicial candidates, although the ABA continues to issue “grades” on 
judicial nominees, which surely are respected in the halls of the Senate. 
 In addition to the ABA, other powerful interest groups have also become part 
of the appointment process, lending support or providing opposition to prospective 
judicial nominees.  The influence of interest groups on the appointment process has 
risen in recent years and is directly correlated to the heightened attention given to 
the appointment process by the media, although the involvement of interest groups 
is not entirely a new phenomenon by any means. Organized business and labor 
groups, such as the National Grange and the Anti-Monopoly League, figured 
prominently in the defeat of President Rutherford B. Hayes’s nomination of Stanley 
Matthews to the Supreme Court in 1881.39 For much of the 1870’s, the Grange was 
successful in lobbying various state governments to pass “Granger” laws regulating 
railroads and railroad monopolies. As the laws began coming under review before 
the Supreme Court, the Grange feared that if Matthews were to be confirmed, he 
would complete a new majority on the Court that would strike down the 
regulations. While still in the Senate, Matthews was an ardent supporter of the 
railroad industry, and it was assumed that he would continue his support, if he were 
successfully appointed to the Supreme Court.40  Accordingly, the Grange mobilized 
their supporters and successfully lobbied the Senate to prevent the Matthews 
confirmation vote from coming to the floor, effectively killing the nomination.  
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 More recently, organized interests have also featured prominently in the 
famous Bork nomination of 1987. Interest groups on the left and the right tried to 
heavily influence the confirmation of Reagan’s famous nominee by trying to paint a 
picture of what Justice Bork would look like. Groups on the left, such as the National 
Women’s Law Center, the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, and the 
National Abortion Rights Action League, publicized Bork’s writings and 
controversial opinions on abortion and civil rights.41 Similarly, groups on the right, 
such as the American Conservative Union, Coalitions for America, and Concerned 
Women for America, tried to focus on Bork’s qualifications and his less-extreme 
legal opinions.42 Ultimately, Bork was defeated, and in no small part his defeat can 
be attributed to the lobbying efforts of organized interest groups. 
 All things considered, it is easy to see how the intricate process of appointing 
judges to the federal judiciary, and certainly to the Supreme Court, is very different 
from the simple prescription found in Article II, Section Two of the Constitution. It is 
also quite evident that there has been considerable activity on the part of the Senate 
pertaining to the judicial appointment process that marks a departure from the 
small “advice and consent” role envisaged by the Framers. Nonetheless, the process 
that exists today reflects a larger role for the Senate to coexist and influence the 
make-up of the Supreme Court – something that history has proved to be a rather 
important power. It remains to be seen, however, how exactly, if at all, this evolved 
process has changed the quality of the appointed justices or the make-up of 
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Supreme Court, and how, if at all, this evolving process factored in to President 
Eisenhower’s botched appointments to the Court. 
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Part IV – Judicial Qualifications 
 In order properly to understand what went wrong with President 
Eisenhower’s judicial appointees, it might be useful to examine what has been the 
traditional course of action for presidents with respect to this important task of 
nominating judges to the Supreme Court. So, what factors or qualifications do 
presidents typically look for in a prospective justice?  
 One unique aspect of the judicial appointment process in the United States that 
sets it apart from other countries is the lack of constitutional or statutory guidelines 
for appointing judges. In Italy, for example, to be appointed to serve on the 
Constitutional Court, one must have previously served as a judge, been a university 
professor of law, or practiced as a lawyer for at least twenty years.43 In Spain, 
appointees to the Supreme Court must have previously served as a magistrate or 
prosecutor, a university professor, a public official, or a lawyer – and “must be 
jurists of acknowledged competence with at least fifteen years of professional 
experience.”44 In the United States, however, the Constitution and subsequent 
legislation relating to the judiciary are silent on the matter of qualities to be 
possessed by a judicial appointee. Accordingly, with tradition being the one possible 
exception, there are virtually no constraints governing who a president may appoint 
to the Supreme Court, giving him a great deal of liberty in the appointment process. 
 What, then, has guided presidents in their appointments? Broadly speaking, all 
presidential appointments have fit into four or five categories describing the 
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motivating factors behind each appointment. These categories, in no particular 
order, are electoral or partisan goals, ideological affinities, personal friendship, and 
balancing the “representativeness” of the Court, i.e., having the Court mirror the 
composition of the general population.45 Sometimes, presidents are also driven to 
appoint certain judges because of an “objective merit” that the appointee is said 
possess, as was the case when Republican President Herbert Hoover appointed 
Democrat Benjamin Cardozo, a man of outstanding accomplishments and 
unparalleled reputation, to replace Justice Holmes in 1932.46 While the factors seem 
distinct, often, the appointment of a justice incorporates all of these ideas to some 
extent.  
 Contrary to the fact that prior to the 2004 presidential election, a statistically 
insignificant .5% of respondents to a poll asking what was the most important issue 
for a president to address answered “the Supreme Court,” electoral and partisan 
goals have certainly factored into the calculus of many presidents appointing 
justices to the High Court.47 Presidents have historically used the importance of 
appointing justices to the Supreme Court to their advantage on the campaign trail, 
sometimes turning their appointment opportunity into nothing more than merely 
honoring a campaign pledge. In 1980, during the course of his presidential 
campaign, Ronald Reagan famously pledged to appoint the first woman to the 
Supreme Court, and he was true to his word when he appointed Sandra Day 
O’Connor to replace Justice Potter Stewart within the first few months of his 
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presidency.48 Some scholars have contended that Eisenhower was motivated by the 
importance of the Catholic vote in his 1956 re-election bid, when he instructed his 
trusted aide and Attorney General to find a suitable Catholic judge for his next 
appointment, but more on this later.49 In terms of the role that “party affiliation” 
plays in appointing judges, one need not look further than the staggering statistic 
that for the vast majority of the twentieth century, 84% of Supreme Court nominees 
were of the same party as the president who nominated them.50 
 Historically, presidents have also sought nominees with whom they share a 
common political and ideological affinity. This has been possibly the most essential 
quality sought after in a nominee, for presidents believe that by appointing someone 
like them, they will ensure a lasting impact on the Supreme Court after they leave 
office. For instance, Reagan who is four presidents removed from the present one, 
has had a lasting conservative impact on policy through his two appointees, Justices 
Scalia and Kennedy, who continue to serve on the Supreme Court and who impact 
national policy in a clear and meaningful way.51 Likewise, President Clinton has seen 
his politics furthered through his appointees, Justices Ginsberg and Breyer, two 
consistent liberal judges, who continue to serve over a decade since Clinton left 
office. The practice of appointing justices with a shared ideological affinity is not by 
any means a recent development. President Washington, who liked to think of 
himself as above the fray of politics, appointed only like-minded Federalists to the 
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Supreme Court. President Jefferson similarly made it his stated goal to clear the 
Court of the Federalists appointed by his predecessors, Washington and Adams, 
which he accomplished when he appointed Justice William Johnson, the first non-
Federalist justice, and Justices Livingston and Todd, both of whom were non-
Federalists.52  
 What of the personal friendship and “representativeness” factors? Presidents 
have always looked to close aides and confidants when tasked with filling a vacancy 
on the Supreme Court. In 1836, President Andrew Jackson appointed Roger Taney, 
his close friend and loyal adviser, as Chief Justice.53 President Truman appointed 
four justices, all close friends and acquaintances, including Chief Justice Fred Vinson, 
Truman’s “favorite poker companion.” 54  More recently, President Johnson’s 
selection of Fortas, a close friend who continued to serve as adviser and aide during 
the four years he was on the Court, reiterates the point that presidents have 
sometimes appointed close friends to the Supreme Court.55 
 When looking to fill vacancies on the Supreme Court, some presidents have 
also been guided by the desire to make the Court’s membership more 
representative of the general population. Initially, presidents sought to have 
geographic regions represented on the Court for purely practical reasons. The 
Judiciary Act of 1789, the earliest embodiment of a framework for the federal 
judiciary, divided the fledgling nation into six judicial circuits. The first justices 
presided over cases in the Supreme Court but also served as circuit court judges, 
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travelling within the circuit to hear cases. The judges were expected to serve the 
circuits in which they were residing prior to appointment, and thus, it made sense 
for presidents to appoint justices from the various geographic regions.56 Although 
this process changed over the years and Supreme Court justices no longer serve as 
circuit court judges, presidents, sometimes not so successfully, have continued to 
appoint judges to ensure that various geographic regions of the country felt 
represented on the Supreme Court. 
 Presidents have also taken it upon themselves to appoint justices with the goal 
of having a Court membership that is representative in terms of race, religion, and 
gender of the overall population. For years, presidents sought to retain certain 
“Catholic seats” or “Jewish seats” such that the makeup of the Supreme Court 
corresponded to the general population, with the appointments of Justices Brennan 
and Brandeis, serving as prime examples of this phenomenon. 57 Although some 
presidents, such as Jimmy Carter and George W. Bush, were unable to appoint 
minority justices to the Supreme Court, their desire to create a more diverse 
judiciary may be seen more on lower federal court appointments, where presidents 
are understood to have considerably more leeway with whom they can appoint. 
President Carter appointed forty women and thirty-seven African-Americans, more 
than all of his predecessors combined, to district and circuit courts around the 
nation.58 In Bush’s first term in office, 10.4% of his two hundred and two 
appointments to lower courts were Hispanic Americans, a higher percentage than 
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any of his predecessors.59  
 It is quite evident that presidents look at a myriad of factors when making 
appointments to the Supreme Court. While we have broken down the factors into 
distinct categories, presidents are usually more likely to choose a nominee who 
embodies more than one of the aforementioned qualities, thus making it difficult to 
say which of these factors has been more prevalent than the others. Before 
proceeding to examine what particular factors influenced President Eisenhower’s 
appointments of Justices Warren, Brennan, and Whittaker, a brief analysis of how 
appointees have matched up to the expectations of their appointing presidents is in 
order. 
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Part V – Measuring “Concordance”  
 When presidents submit judicial nominations to the Senate for consideration, 
presumably, they have selected candidates whom they believe will decide cases 
much as they would like them to. However, history has shown that sometimes, 
presidents’ appointments have yielded some wildly unpredictable justices and 
equally unpredictable decisions that have emanated from the very institution they 
sought to mold after their own image. There have been several forays into this area 
that have used statistical data analysis to measure “concordance,” or the degree to 
which justices, once appointed, have behaved in a manner that is consistent with the 
expectations of their nominating presidents. The vast majority of these studies seem 
to conclude that, by and large, most justices have conformed to the expectations of 
those who nominated them and that the few deviating justices seem to be the 
exception and not the rule.  
 Before one can ascertain whether justices have conformed to the expected 
behaviors of those who nominate them, it is necessary to determine quantifiable 
metrics by which to measure the ideologies or political preferences of the 
nominating presidents. There have been numerous studies of considerable 
prominence that have measured presidential preferences in several different ways. 
Some, such as Rhode and Spaeth, have relied on base-line metrics, such as party 
affiliation, to determine ideologies of presidents.60 Others, such as Heck and Shull, 
have looked to infer presidential preferences by analyzing expressed presidential 
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statements.61 However, problems abound with both approaches. For instance, by 
looking at presidential preferences based merely on party affiliation, an erroneous 
assumption is made that all presidents who belong to the same party have the same 
beliefs. On the other hand, by looking at presidential statements to infer ideological 
preferences, statisticians are taking for granted that presidents express their true 
ideological beliefs in their public statements, perhaps an ideal, but not a realistic 
assumption.  
 A third way of measuring presidential preferences that hoped to evade these 
problems was used by Segal, Timpone, and Howard.62 They randomly surveyed 
experts on the American Presidency with the intention of placing all modern 
presidents, from 1937 until the time of publication on a broad conservative-liberal 
spectrum with respect to both social issues and economics. Although the study 
relies upon reputational surveys, which may sometimes yield unreliable results, 
political scientists have been using this surveying technique extensively to provide 
“valid and reliable measures of otherwise immeasurable variables.”63 They compiled 
their results in the following table:64 
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As depicted in the table, President Johnson was found to have had the most liberal 
social policies, whereas President Roosevelt was found to have had the most liberal 
economic policies. President Reagan, as one would assume, was found to have had 
the most conservative social and economic policies. The inefficacy of using the Heck 
and Shull metrics are clearly demonstrated when considering Eisenhower’s rating of 
ninety-seven (extremely liberal) by their standards and Eisenhower’s ratings of 
around thirty-seven using the Segal, Timpone, and Howard standards.  
 Having already shown which presidents they found to be more conservative or 
liberal, they then proceed to measure the liberal tendencies of the justices by 
looking at the percent of liberal votes cast by each justice. The evidence 
overwhelmingly indicated that liberal presidents tend to select liberal justices and 
conservative presidents tend to appoint conservative justices. Nevertheless, there 
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are some striking outliers that highlight several “deviating justices.” The following 
table contains the results of the Segal, Timpone, and Howard study:65 
 
 
Clustered together in the bottom left corner are the justices with the smallest 
percent of liberal votes cast and corresponding to those conservative justices are 
the conservative presidents who appointed them. In the top right corner are found 
the justices with the highest percentages of liberal votes cast by justices 
corresponding to the liberal presidents who appointed them. Justice Stevens, a Ford 
appointee, Justice Souter, a George H.W. Bush appointee, Justice Blackmun, a Nixon 
appointee, and Justice White, a Kennedy appointee, seem to be somewhat deviant 
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justices.  
 But perhaps the most striking cases of deviating justices seem to be two 
Eisenhower appointees, Justices Warren and Brennan. Of the presidents who have 
deviant justices, only Eisenhower has two. Both of those two deviating justices hold 
the two highest percentages for liberal votes cast, about seventy-seven percent for 
Warren and seventy-three percent for Brennan, and Eisenhower, a moderate 
conservative, appointed both of them. The evidence begs the question of how 
President Eisenhower botched these two appointments? The remainder of this 
paper seeks to answer this question by addressing the two appointments and 
analyzing the various historical and political factors associated with each of the 
appointments. A third troubling Eisenhower appointee, Justice Whittaker, felt so out 
of his depth upon his appointment that he became depressed and resigned. On its 
own, this tragic tale might not be of significance in answering the question of how 
presidents appoint justices to the Supreme Court, but when combined with the 
botched appointments of Warren and Brennan, it further serves to indict the judicial 
appointment apparatus of the Eisenhower administration. What, then, can explain 
the failings of Eisenhower’s appointments to the Supreme Court? As we shall see, 
the answer rests in a series of historical events and politically motivated decisions 
that left an undeniable impact on the laws and policies of the United States for the 
remainder of the twentieth century. 
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Ike’s Mistakes 
I. The First Vacancy 
 
The year was 1953, and President Eisenhower had only been in office eight 
months when he received word that Chief Justice Fred Vinson had died of a sudden 
heart attack.66 Vinson’s death was unexpected, it caught Eisenhower and his 
Attorney General, Herbert Brownell, by surprise, and it created a vacancy on the 
Supreme Court. Conventional wisdom holds that Eisenhower’s hands were tied with 
respect to his first appointment because of a promise he had made a year and a half 
earlier when he was running for President. In reality, though, the history of 
Eisenhower’s first appointment is far more complicated than just fulfilling a 
promise.  
In his first presidential campaign, Dwight Eisenhower was somewhat of a 
reluctant candidate.67 Eisenhower, who had previously led the United States to 
victory in World War II, had been appointed by President Truman in 1950 to be the 
Supreme Commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), tasked with 
overseeing the buildup of a NATO military force.68 Based out of Paris, it was a 
comfortable post Eisenhower enjoyed; he firmly believed in the fledgling institution 
and its role in preventing another world war, and felt that his presence and 
dedication was needed to ensure its survival.69 He also feared that his entry into 
politics as a military man might upset the American tradition of keeping the military 
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out of politics and civilian affairs.70 It was only after a persistent recruitment effort 
by leaders of the Republican Party, particularly, leaders of the Eastern 
Establishment wing of the party, such as Gov. Thomas Dewey, Gen. Lucius Clay, Sen. 
Henry Cabot Lodge, and Brownell, Chairman of the Republican National Committee, 
that Eisenhower agreed to consider running for President as the Republican 
nominee in 1952.71 After several encouraging signs, such as winning the New 
Hampshire primary, receiving over a hundred thousand write-in votes in Minnesota, 
and an impressively large Eisenhower-for-President rally held in Madison Square 
Garden in New York City, Eisenhower resigned from his NATO post and the U.S. 
Army on May 11, 1952 and returned to the United States to begin his fight for the 
Republican nomination.72  
  The Republican National Convention began only a few months later in 
Chicago with what seemed to be a major rupture in the GOP. At the outset of the 
convention, Senator Robert Taft of Ohio, a staunch conservative, was seen as the 
ideological favorite among a majority of the delegates. Moreover, Taft forces 
dominated the Republican National Committee and many state Republican parties, 
bringing him a solid advantage with respect to the organization and the rules 
governing the convention.73 It was clear that the contest between Eisenhower and 
Taft would be a dead-heat, and the nomination would likely hinge on a small 
contingent of delegates committing to one side or the other. It was in this context 
that special attention was given to Gov. Warren, who led the California delegation, 
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which was seen as the key group of delegates who would decide the fate of the 
nomination.74 The tide had turned, though, and in Eisenhower’s favor, when the 
Convention voted to adopt the Fair Play Amendment, a procedural change that 
allowed only uncontested delegates to vote on the question of whether to seat 
contested delegates as permanent delegates.75  
Before the amendment passed, contested delegates temporarily placed on 
the convention rolls were allowed to vote themselves into becoming permanent 
delegates. As Taft and Eisenhower battled for the nomination, their respective 
forces worked on getting uncontested delegates to seat delegates friendly to them 
from delegate-rich contested states like Texas, Louisiana, and Georgia. After serious 
campaigning and tough negotiating, Eisenhower managed to get many of his 
delegates from all three states seated at the convention and was well on his way to 
victory. At the end of the first ballot, Eisenhower stood at five hundred and ninety 
five votes (just nine shy of clinching the nomination), Taft had five hundred, Gov. 
Earl Warren of California had eighty-one, Gov. Harold Stassen of Minnesota had 
twenty, and Gen. Douglas MacArthur had ten.76 Before the results were announced, 
however, Stassen surrendered the entire Minnesota delegation to Eisenhower, and 
Eisenhower won a majority, effectively becoming the Republican nominee for 
President.77 
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The story of the 1952 Republican Convention is intrinsically tied to the story 
of Earl Warren’s nomination to the Supreme Court. When Warren arrived in Chicago 
for the convention, he brought with him a delegation from California that was 
committed to voting for him on the first ballot.78 He had hoped that the ensuing 
stalemate between Taft and Eisenhower would lead to a brokered convention, 
which, in his view, might select a popular moderate, like himself. At the early stages 
of the convention, both Taft and Eisenhower forces tried to court Warren and the 
California delegation, with Taft even offering Warren the vice-presidency, a 
commitment he had already made to Gen. MacArthur, but which he made clear he 
would rescind.79 Warren refused, and maintained that his delegation was committed 
to supporting him in the first ballot. The exchange troubled him, leading him to 
doubt both Taft’s “sensitivity to human relations” and whether he could be elected 
President.80 
Warren was similarly disillusioned with the Eisenhower campaign’s efforts 
to sway the California delegation’s support in his favor. At the forefront of this 
maneuver was the ambitious junior Senator from California, Richard Nixon, who, 
according to Warren, had his supporters “hold caucuses and urge other delegates to 
support Eisenhower on the first ballot.”81 When Eisenhower ultimately clinched the 
nomination, Brownell asked Warren to join the committee tasked with selecting a 
vice presidential candidate, but Warren refused, believing it to be a “fait accompli” 
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that Nixon would get the nod in recognition of his efforts to steer Warren’s 
committed delegates towards Eisenhower.82 
Many, including Eisenhower’s biographers, Chester J. Pach and Elmo 
Richardson, have held that Warren’s Supreme Court nomination was the result of a 
commitment that was made to him at the convention.83 According to this version of 
events, Lucius D. Clay, one of Eisenhower’s convention managers, promised Warren 
a position in the cabinet in return for getting the seventy-man California delegation, 
which he headed, to withhold voting for Taft, thereby creating a stalemate, and to 
support the Fair-Play Amendment. Although Warren was indeed presented with an 
offer by Eisenhower’s transition team to head the Interior department, which he 
refused, the likelihood of such a deal being struck between Eisenhower and Warren 
is suspect.84  
While Warren’s support was instrumental in passing the Fair-Play 
Amendment, without which Eisenhower’s nomination would not have been 
possible, Warren never threw the support of the California delegation behind 
Eisenhower, even after Eisenhower clinched the nomination, contrary to popular 
belief.85  Moreover, there are several theories that would even give Warren 
considerable motivation for not backing Eisenhower at the convention, which would 
further suggest that no grand bargain of any sort took place. According to one 
theory, Sen. William Knowland, Warren’s campaign manager, had been promised by 
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Sen. Everett Dirksen, a Taft supporter, that if Taft and Eisenhower deadlocked, he 
would swing Taft’s votes to Warren, giving Warren the nomination.86 Certainly this 
would have provided sufficient motivation for Warren to want to prevent 
Eisenhower from securing the nomination. According to another theory, Warren 
never gave Eisenhower his overt support because he suspected that would preclude 
him from taking a position in the Eisenhower administration, fearing the perception 
of a backroom political deal.87 Yet another view held that Warren harbored 
resentment towards Eisenhower for his refusal to support Warren’s opposition to 
loyalty oaths for faculty of state universities in California two years earlier, and thus 
would have not likely helped Eisenhower win the nomination.88  Still, according to 
Bernard Shanley, Eisenhower’s special counsel, brokering such a secretive political 
deal was antithetical to everything that Eisenhower believed in. On the myth of the 
Eisenhower-Warren bargain, Shanley once said, “Eisenhower would not do that…I 
think he figured he’d rather lose than…get into that type of discussion. He was not a 
politician, and he wasn’t prepared to do it.”89 Eisenhower thought himself a morally 
upright individual, and, accordingly, he would have been opposed to his staff 
working out such a deal to secure his nomination, which would have tarnished his 
reputation of being an honest and widely respected military general. 
Furthermore, despite Eisenhower’s refusal to use the Supreme Court as a 
talking point in either of his two presidential campaigns, he frequently admonished, 
both in public and private, the policies of Truman and F.D.R., his predecessors, of 
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using Supreme Court appointments to reward loyalty. Eisenhower criticized the 
practice of awarding judgeships on the basis of “patronage” and “partisanship,” and 
made it clear that he intended to appoint only “individuals of the highest possible 
standing.”90 In this light, it seems highly improbable that Eisenhower would have 
engaged in similar practices for his first appointment to the Supreme Court, though 
unfortunately, hypocrisy is not foreign to politics, and Eisenhower’s other Supreme 
Court appointments seem to portend that he was not quite as meritocratic in his 
selections as he might have liked to think. 
Eisenhower claimed that though he was greatly appreciative of Warren’s 
support of the Fair-Play Amendment, he personally never believed he was indebted 
to him.91 If Eisenhower was not bound by such a secret commitment, what, then, 
could have led him to choose Warren to fill his first vacancy on the Supreme Court? 
Eisenhower’s interest in Warren as a possible contender may be traced back to the 
transition period during which President-Elect Eisenhower and his most trusted 
aide, Brownell, who had been tasked with heading the transition team, worked on 
finding suitable cabinet members and others to fill various administration posts. 
Brownell, who had been offered the Attorney General position by Eisenhower on 
election night, was the cabinet member the President knew best upon taking office, 
though their association dated back just a few short months to several lengthy 
conversations they had when he visited Eisenhower in Paris in 1952 to implore him 
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to run in the first place.92 During a visit to his transition headquarters in December, 
1952, Eisenhower concluded he would not be able to offer Warren, then-Governor 
of California, a position of appropriate stature in his new administration.  
These positions, Attorney General and Secretary of State, had already been 
offered to Brownell and John Foster Dulles, respectively.93 Though Warren had also 
been considered for the Secretary of Interior (he was not much interested in the 
post), his nomination for the position would have been seen as provocative. At the 
time, there was a controversial dispute between California and Arizona over water 
rights to the Colorado River, which would have precluded a nominee from either 
state.94 Thus, there was no available spot for Warren in the newly formed 
Eisenhower Cabinet. According to Brownell,  
Ike was worried that Warren might feel sort of left 
out…[H]e said ‘we want to keep him enthusiastic for the 
Eisenhower administration and if we go ahead and 
announce the whole Cabinet without any mention of 
Warren, I’m afraid he will misunderstand and feel he wasn’t 
a top-ranking Republican.’ He told me that he wanted to call 
Warren on the phone, and offer him the first available 
vacancy on the Supreme Court.95  
 
If Warren did not provide any material support for Eisenhower at the 1952 
Republican National Convention, what was it about Warren that led Eisenhower to 
make such an offer? 
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 Although Warren was not readily supportive of an Eisenhower nomination at 
the convention, once Eisenhower won the nomination, Warren played an influential 
role in the general election campaign in the following weeks and months. After 
Eisenhower was nominated, Warren directed the California campaign for the 
Republican ticket and served as a surrogate, travelling to other parts of the country 
to stump for Eisenhower, despite his personal animosity for his running mate, 
Richard Nixon, then, a senator from California. 96  When Eisenhower was 
campaigning on the West Coast, Warren frequently joined him, and the two men met 
regularly. Eisenhower was impressed and almost captivated by the statesmanship 
exhibited by Warren. He admired the degree to which Warren spoke and governed 
his state in a nonpartisan way, as well as Warren’s broad appeal across the political 
spectrum.97 After all, just two years earlier, both the Republican and Democratic 
parties had nominated Warren for a third term.98 It was this kind of statesmanship 
that appealed to Eisenhower, a fellow politician who endeavored to be a similarly 
nonpartisan, middle-of-the-road type president.  
 Having already promised Warren an appointment to the Supreme Court 
upon the first vacancy, Eisenhower approached Brownell in the spring of 1953, 
looking to fill the solicitor general position. In preparation for an eventual vacancy 
on the Supreme Court, Eisenhower felt it a good idea to offer the position to Warren, 
as an opportunity to reacquaint himself with the law, as he had not been a practicing 
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attorney for almost ten years.99 Warren graciously accepted the offer and informed 
Brownell that he would begin preparations for the move as soon as he returned 
from his trip abroad, as part of the U.S. delegation to England for Queen Elizabeth’s 
coronation.  
 Before Warren could even begin serving as the Solicitor General, though, 
Chief Justice Vinson died, leaving Eisenhower with his “first vacancy” – a vacant 
chief justiceship. As Attorney General, Brownell was asked by Eisenhower to 
compile the records of four or five people whom the President seriously considered, 
including Warren. Although Warren had been promised “the first vacancy,” no one 
would have imagined that that would necessarily mean the chief justiceship, and 
Eisenhower was not sure how to proceed. In the president’s own words, 
 A few months prior to the death of Chief Justice Vinson, I 
had talked to Gov. Earl Warren of California…During this 
conversation I told the Governor that I was considering 
the possibility of appointing him to the Supreme Court 
and I was definitely inclined to do so if, in the future, a 
vacancy should occur. However, neither he nor I was 
thinking of the special post of Chief Justice nor was I 
definitely committed to any appointment.100   
 
Eisenhower dispatched Brownell to California to meet with Warren and assess how 
Warren had interpreted the earlier phone call concerning the appointment. In the 
meanwhile, Eisenhower instructed Brownell to continue researching the other 
prospective nominees, which included Chief Judge John T. Parker of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Chief Justice of New Jersey Arthur T. Vanderbilt, and 
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the possible elevation of Associate Justice Robert Jackson.101 While vacationing in 
Colorado the week after Vinson’s funeral, Eisenhower wrote a letter to his brother 
and trusted advisor, Milton, in which he outlined his thoughts on the ideal candidate 
for the Chief Justiceship appointment. He wanted a man of “known and recognized 
integrity, of wide experience in government, of competence in the law, and of 
national stature in reputation so as to be useful in my effort to restore the Court to 
the high position of prestige that it once enjoyed.”102 Here, he was most likely 
hinting at his predecessor, Harry Truman’s, penchant for nominating friends to the 
Supreme Court, and in doing so, diminishing the image of the High Court, but also to 
the highly political and activist Court of the 1920’s and 30’s, which had seen its 
reputation as a respected and independent institution diminished.    
 Ultimately, Parker, a previously failed Supreme Court nominee in 1930, was 
removed from the short list because of his old age.103 Vanderbilt, who had suffered a 
recent heart attack and was perceived to be too ill for the job, was removed from the 
list, as well.104 Brownell and Eisenhower also decided against elevating Associate 
Justice Robert Jackson for two principal reasons. Firstly, Jackson had aroused the 
hostility of several important senators in his acceptance of the position for chief 
prosecutor at the Nuremberg Trials of Nazi war criminals while he was a sitting 
Supreme Court justice. Secondly, Jackson had been an advocate for F.D.R.’s 
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controversial Court-packing bill when he served as Roosevelt’s Solicitor General.105 
For these reasons, coupled with the fact that Jackson was viewed as somewhat of a 
divisive figure, who publicly feuded with Justice Black, Eisenhower and Brownell 
ruled out the possibility of elevating Jackson to Chief Justice.106 Thus, with no one 
left to consider, Warren seemed somewhat of an inevitable nominee. 
 The President had first become acquainted with some of Warren’s views 
when he and Brownell met in Paris in 1952, and had a lengthy discussion on leading 
figures in the Republican Party and likely candidates for the nomination. Brownell 
had explained to Eisenhower that Warren was an internationalist and a supporter of 
the United Nations, and, domestically, he was considered a progressive who 
supported legislation for fair-employment practices for black citizens, as well as an 
expansion of public health and social security programs.107 When Eisenhower 
appointed Warren to the U.S. delegation to attend the Queen’s coronation, he had 
the opportunity to briefly discuss with him his views and general political 
philosophy. Eisenhower found him to be a “man of high ideals and common 
sense.”108  Until that time, Warren and Eisenhower had discussed their political 
views only once, on a public television program that aired during the presidential 
campaign, and although they met frequently throughout the campaign, discussions 
were centered predominantly on the state of the presidential race.109 Looking for 
more information prior to what seemed to be an inevitable appointment, 
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Eisenhower informed his Attorney General that he should travel to California to 
ascertain Warren’s interpretation of the earlier commitment and to study the 
Governor’s public record. 
 Preceding his departure to meet with Warren, Eisenhower had also relayed 
to Brownell the necessity for a Chief Justice to be a nonpartisan figure, someone 
above the “fray of politics.”110 Warren had been a popular and successful three-term 
Governor and an effective and competent administrator with a proven record as a 
political moderate. His national stature, another important factor for Eisenhower, as 
Thomas Dewey’s vice presidential running mate in 1948 and as a 1952 presidential 
primary candidate, added to his extensive list of qualifications. Lastly, Eisenhower 
wanted a chief justice with previous experience in public affairs; he needed 
someone who would command instant public confidence, not only for his personal 
integrity and professional competency, but also for his proven success in public 
life.111 With that, Eisenhower dispatched Brownell to meet with Warren. 
 During the secret meeting at McClellan Air Base near Sacramento, Warren 
made it abundantly clear to Brownell that he understood Eisenhower’s offer of “the 
next vacancy” to mean the very next vacancy, regardless of the type of vacancy that 
might occur.112 While meeting with Warren to learn of his interpretation of 
Eisenhower’s earlier commitment, Brownell also took the opportunity to interview 
Warren for the post. They had a discussion on the proper relationship between the 
executive branch, specifically the Attorney General, and the Court on the 
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administration of the federal court system. Warren seemed to indicate that despite 
the doctrine of separation of powers, there had to be certain areas of cooperation. 
For example, Warren suggested the development of programs designed to expedite 
judicial procedures and to eliminate backlogs in court calendars. He also believed 
that the president needed to expand the Judicial Conference, an administrative body 
of the federal court system presided over by the Chief Justice and composed at the 
time of senior members of various federal appeals courts, through the addition of 
younger federal judges.113 Brownell’s focus, in short, seems to suggest that he was 
more interested in Warren’s views on the administrative issues pertaining to the 
federal court system than on matters of constitutional jurisprudence—a glaring 
oversight that, if true, would seem to indicate that Eisenhower and Brownell found 
Warren’s judicial philosophy unimportant. Nonetheless, there is some reason to 
believe that Brownell, while an astute political strategist, was much more concerned 
with administrative issues in general. For instance, during his stint as chairman of 
the Republican National Committee, he was more interested in improving 
fundraising initiatives and ballot techniques than, say, ordinary politicking.114 Upon 
his return to Washington, Brownell reported to the President all that had transpired 
in the meeting, and the following day, Eisenhower nominated Warren to become the 
fourteenth Chief Justice of the United States.115  
 President Eisenhower officially forwarded Warren’s name to the Senate on 
October 2, 1953, less than a month after Chief Justice Vinson’s death. Although 
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Warren was not confirmed until many months later, on March 1, 1954, he began 
sitting as Chief Justice immediately. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for himself and 
several other members of the Court, informed the president that a number of 
important cases, including a rehearing of Brown v. Board of Education, were before 
the Court at the beginning of the October term, and that it was imperative for 
Warren to hear the cases, even though he remained unconfirmed.116   
 Eisenhower’s recess appointment of Earl Warren was the first of its kind in 
well over a century.117 Article II, Section Two of the Constitution authorizes the 
president to fill vacancies even when the Senate is in recess, allowing the nominee 
to legally serve until the Senate returns to act on the nomination.118  When Congress 
returned to session in January 1954, Warren’s recess appointment faced a few 
minor hurdles, as Republican Senator William Langer of North Dakota, Chairman of 
the Judiciary Committee, and a few conservative Southern Democrats on the 
committee attacked Warren’s “left-wing” and “ultraliberal” views.119 They lodged a 
series of ten protests arising from Warren’s stint as California Attorney General, 
which included corruption charges and allegations of Warren being illegally under 
the influence of the notorious liquor lobbyist, Artie Samish.120 They succeeded in 
preventing a vote for several weeks, but after the Judiciary Committee 
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recommended confirmation twelve votes to three, and the vote finally came to the 
Senate floor on March 1st, Warren was confirmed unanimously.121 
 Presumably, Eisenhower and Brownell understood the significance attached 
to Supreme Court appointments, and one would expect that they did not take the 
President’s responsibility to appoint a justice lightly. In a letter to his boyhood 
friend discussing civil rights in the wake of the highly controversial 1954 school 
desegregation cases, Eisenhower wrote,  
There must be respect for the Constitution—which 
means the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
Constitution…We cannot possibly imagine a successful 
form of government in which every individual citizen 
would have the right to interpret the Constitution 
according to his own convictions, beliefs, and 
prejudices. Chaos would develop...122  
 
Although he seems to exhibit a basic understanding of the role of the Supreme 
Court, his apparent lack of interest evidenced by the absence of a comprehensive 
vetting of Warren’s views on civil rights and national security, or anything else, for 
that matter, indicates that either Eisenhower may have greatly underestimated the 
due diligence demanded by such an important decision, or just that he did not 
necessarily think it was relevant to ascertain Warren’s political views.  
 If, in fact, he did not fully appreciate the opportunity to nominate a justice to 
the Supreme Court, certainly Brownell, who purportedly possessed a keen sense for 
politics, and who, as a top attorney, should have understood the importance of 
investigating a judge’s political views, could have been expected to undertake a 
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careful vetting of Warren. In his memoirs, Brownell wrote, “[n]ominating an 
individual to the position of chief justice of the United States Supreme Court is one 
of the most important exercises of a president’s constitutional powers.”123 However, 
as was the case with Eisenhower, Brownell’s recitation of platitudes about the court 
and the importance of appointing justices to the court are belied by his actions that 
suggest the contrary. In reality, it seems to be the case that, by design, they chose 
not to look deeply into Warren’s political views, perhaps because they thought they 
knew him well enough. 
 When Warren was being considered for the appointment, it was understood 
that Vinson’s seat had to be filled quickly, as the justices had ordered a rehearing of 
oral arguments in the Brown case. Eisenhower and Brownell knew, or they certainly 
should have known, that Warren would have to vote on the merits of the case. 
Eisenhower had taught constitutional law at West Point, and, personally, he believed 
that segregation ought to remain a state issue.124 He was a firm believer in states’ 
rights and federalism, and was opposed to the view that the federal government 
would enforce racial integration of public schools.125 Moreover, Eisenhower was 
raised in Kansas, where segregation had been practiced, and had spent his whole life 
in the military—a segregated environment.126 Although the President had warmed 
to the civil rights movement, as evident by his desegregation of naval bases in the 
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South and of virtually all public facilities in Washington, D.C., in accordance with a 
pre-existing District of Columbia local ordinance, he certainly was not looking 
forward to presiding over a civil rights revolution.127 Yet though aware of Warren’s 
efforts to end racial discrimination in employment in California, Eisenhower 
nominated him for Chief Justice. Perhaps the President and Attorney General failed 
to foresee the enormous consequences of Brown, but as the legal community could 
talk of little else, this is hard to fathom.  
 Another point worth mentioning is how Eisenhower felt compelled to 
nominate Warren to the Supreme Court, given his ostensible lack of legal distinction. 
Why did Eisenhower call Warren and offer him “the first vacancy” to begin with? 
Why could he not have promised him a nomination to State or Attorney General 
when they became vacant? The answer to this question primarily resides in 
Eisenhower’s deep admiration for the type of politician that Earl Warren was. 
Warren possessed the principal quality that Eisenhower looked for in a judge—he 
was the ultimate statesman. After it had become known that Warren would be the 
nominee, Eisenhower’s brothers, Edgar and Milton, both criticized the choice and 
argued that nominating Warren would be a mistake that would cost the President “a 
lot of support; in their view, it was important for Eisenhower to appoint a lawyer to 
the Court, and not another professor or politician.”128  
 Eisenhower’s response to his brother’s criticisms captures the essence of 
the rationale behind the Warren nomination. Eisenhower wrote, 
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I believe we need statesmanship on the Supreme Court. 
Statesmanship is developed in the hard knocks of 
general experience, private and public. Naturally, a 
man occupying the post must be competent in the 
law—and Warren had seventeen years of practice in 
public law, during which his record was one of 
remarkable accomplishment and success…He has been 
very definitely a liberal-conservative; he represents the 
kind of political, economic, and social thinking that I 
believe we need on the Supreme Court.129 
 
Prior to becoming Governor of California, Warren had served as deputy district 
attorney of Alameda County, California from 1920 to 1925, and then as district 
attorney until 1939. He then served as Attorney General of California from 1939 
until 1943, where he infamously advocated the internment of Japanese during 
World War II.130 But it seems that Eisenhower was drawn to Warren not because of 
his legal expertise, but because he respected his statesmanship and because he 
envisioned that Warren resembled the man Eisenhower believed himself to be. He 
offered him the first vacancy because he felt the Court “lacked statesmen” of 
“national stature” with “middle-of-the-road views.”131 He believed that Warren 
would bring to the Supreme Court what he himself had brought first to the military 
and then to politics and the White House—a philosophy of leadership rooted in 
common sense, practicality, and balance. Thus, even though Warren was by no 
means a top legal scholar, he was chosen because he exhibited other qualities 
Eisenhower wanted in a Supreme Court justice, and, undoubtedly, because 
Eisenhower saw a lot of himself in his first nominee.  
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  Such is the story of how Earl Warren filled Eisenhower’s first vacancy on the 
Supreme Court. While Eisenhower and Brownell vigorously denied any “grand 
bargain” at the 1952 Republican National Convention, many scholars still believe 
that Warren’s appointment was simply repaying a debt incurred by Warren’s 
behind-the-scenes work at the convention. We may never know the full truth 
surrounding Warren’s nomination, as the historical record seems to be somewhat 
inconsistent. Nevertheless, we do have a fairly decent and workable understanding 
of the story behind Eisenhower’s first appointment to the Supreme Court.  
 Eisenhower’s second appointment came in October 1954 with the death of 
Justice Jackson. This time, Brownell’s promise to his longtime friend, John Marshall 
Harlan II, led to his eventual nomination. In fact, Brownell never considered anyone 
else for the post, and Eisenhower remained extraordinarily passive with respect to 
one of his most important responsibilities.132 Eisenhower greatly respected and 
trusted Brownell and delegated a considerable amount of authority to him in 
making decisions in his area of expertise, the law.  
 In fact, Eisenhower routinely delegated authority and tasks to his 
subordinates, something, for which he was often criticized. Indeed, Eisenhower’s 
propensity to rely on subordinates, who were tasked with carrying out the bulk of 
his responsibilities, has come to be regarded as one of the most defining 
characteristics of his presidency, leading some, such as Fred Greenstein to go as far 
as labeling Eisenhower’s time in office as the “hidden-hand presidency.” His 
wartime experience of commanding a vast, intricate organization and his extensive 
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staff experience in the army, an institution with an explicitly defined and elaborate 
organizational structure, undoubtedly accounted for the way in which the President 
approached the delegation of authority in the White House.133  He had grown 
accustomed to working in and leading a highly compartmentalized hierarchical 
structure, in which his staff worked on matters in their fields of expertise and came 
to him only with their recommendations.134 As president, he expected his cabinet 
officers to run their departments, and not come to him with problems within their 
purview. To Eisenhower, they were the equivalent of army commanders; if 
problems arose concerning any particular unit, the respective army commanders 
would have handled it on their own.135 In the area of judicial appointments, 
Eisenhower did not have much to contribute, and he believed Brownell would be 
better suited to lead a comprehensive and well-informed search for judicial 
nominees.  
 According to Brownell, when asked to compare Dewey and Eisenhower, two 
men he served for prolonged periods of time, he offered that whereas Dewey 
involved himself more in the “mechanics of government and the operations of his 
subordinates,” concerning the members of his Cabinet, Eisenhower took the 
position of “this is your job, you go ahead and do it.”136 Similarly, according to 
Robert Anderson, who, over the course of two terms served as Eisenhower’s 
Secretary of the Navy, Defense, and Treasury,  
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President Eisenhower’s background in history was a 
military one. He came up through all of his life in the 
atmosphere of having staffs, delegating large amounts of 
responsibility, assuming large responsibility delegated to 
him, but having a very tight staff operation. For example, 
when I was in the Treasury, I have no recollection of the 
President ever calling me to suggest a policy or anything 
of the sort. It was always the other way around…137 
 
A common theme running through these testimonials is that clearly Eisenhower’s 
military experience informed the way in which he approached government. 
Additionally, it was precisely that experience that made him more comfortable 
relying on his subordinates to carry out large tasks because, in his view, he had been 
expected to do the same for his superiors.  
 Ostensibly, for Eisenhower, it was all about efficiency and organization, 
which he understood as essential to effectively managing the White House and its 
peripheral bureaucratic agencies. Eisenhower saw a tremendous failure in the 
management styles of his predecessors, Truman and F.D.R., because they were too 
involved in the day-to-day operations of the White House.138  Truman met every 
morning with the senior members of his staff, and would assign daily tasks and lay 
out priorities for the day. 139  What Truman saw as hands-on management, 
Eisenhower understood as overbearing and not conducive to efficient 
administration. One of Eisenhower’s first administrative concerns as president-elect 
was to devise a White House structure that suited his management style; he strongly 
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believed in the need for an effective personal staff to assure an efficient 
government.140  
 Prior to his inauguration, he created the President’s Advisory Committee on 
Government Organization, which he later incorporated into the Executive Office of 
the President, which was tasked with developing and implementing immediate 
improvements in the organization and management of the executive branch.141 He 
also instituted a major organizational innovation with the advent of a White House 
Chief-of-Staff, a position that endures to this day. In the military, Eisenhower had 
grown accustomed to having a chief-of-staff, relying heavily on Walter Bedell Smith 
for ensuring that his high command ran smoothly. As Eisenhower’s Chief-of-Staff, 
Smith was seen as the “principal coordinating agency of the command,” and his 
duties included nearly everything from keeping the General informed to seeing 
through the execution of Eisenhower’s orders and instructions.142 
 For his White House Chief-of-Staff, Eisenhower turned to one of his former 
campaign managers, Sherman Adams. Adams quickly became a central figure in the 
White House, and was responsible for handling the President’s appointments and 
his schedule, overseeing White House personnel, communicating with the press, 
speechwriting, and managing congressional relations.143 It was his job to ensure 
that any and all advice given to the President had multiple credible sources, that it 
had been properly staffed out before it made its way to the Oval Office, and that once 
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the President had made a decision, it was communicated back down the “chain of 
command.”144 Adams also stood between the President and some of the members of 
his Cabinet, often reviewing their work before allowing them to offer advice to 
Eisenhower, although Brownell insisted that Adams never interfered with any 
business between him and his department and the president. 145 Thus, Brownell still 
enjoyed relatively direct and open lines of communication with the President. 
 To the point of why Eisenhower may have been so passive on Brownell’s 
recommendations, we can look further into the President’s views on the utility of 
delegating authority. In a letter to Henry Luce, Eisenhower’s friend and co-founder 
of Time, Inc., he wrote, 
The government of the United States has become too big, 
too complex, and too pervasive in its influence on all our 
lives for one individual to pretend to direct the 
details…Competent assistants are mandatory; without 
them, the executive branch would bog down. Principal 
subordinates must have confidence that they and their 
positions are widely respected, and the chief must do his 
part in assuring that this is so.146 
 
Evidently, Eisenhower relied extensively on delegating authority to his 
subordinates, and felt that doing so was integral to effectively managing the 
executive branch. In this light, his almost blind passivity towards Brownell’s 
recommendations may best be interpreted as an effort on the President’s part to 
make Brownell feel comfortable in his role as trusted advisor and confidante. That 
the President may have used the opportunity of appointing a justice to the Supreme 
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Court solely on Brownell’s insistence to convey that message to his Attorney General 
offers reason to suggest that perhaps Eisenhower may have misunderstood the 
significance of being presented with the opportunity to name a justice to the 
Supreme Court. 
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II. A Third Opportunity  
 
 President Eisenhower was gearing up for his re-election, when, on 
September 7, 1956, just two months shy of Election Day, he received a letter from 
Justice Sherman Minton, informing him of his decision to retire, effective October 
15th.147 Minton’s retirement resulted from a combination of a fundamental lack of 
interest in his activities on the Court and his deteriorating health; he suffered a 
heart attack in 1945 prior to his appointment, badly broke his leg in 1949 that left 
him walking with a cane for the rest of his life, and battled with anemia all his life.148 
Minton, a staunch Democrat, retired the moment he became eligible for full 
retirement benefits, despite the implication that it presented Republican 
Eisenhower with a third vacancy.149  
The story behind Eisenhower’s third appointment of William J. Brennan to 
the Supreme Court is a very different one from the previous two nominations. The 
following is the little known tale of how Eisenhower came to nominate Justice 
Brennan to the Supreme Court, in what would amount to Eisenhower’s second 
potential mishap with respect to judicial appointments. 
 As had been the standard practice for judicial appointments, Attorney 
General Brownell led the search for prospective nominees. As previously noted, 
Eisenhower had been known to extensively delegate authority to cabinet members 
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to carry out tasks; his experience as a highly skilled and effective administrator as a 
former commander of the Allied Forces in Europe and of NATO and as a General of 
the U.S. Army, had allowed him to rely heavily on delegating considerable authority 
to his aides.150 No one within the Eisenhower administration, perhaps with the lone 
exception of Secretary of State Dulles, enjoyed as much unrestricted power and 
influence as Brownell. Unlike certain members of the cabinet who did not have the 
president’s complete trust, such as Defense Secretary Charles Wilson, Brownell had 
far more latitude in policy-making than he had ever expected. Eisenhower rarely, if 
ever, corrected him.151 
 Brownell, like his boss, was a mid-westerner, who hailed from Nebraska. He 
went on to graduate from Yale Law School and was a successful securities lawyer at 
the firm of Lord, Day, & Lord.152 After just two years at the firm, in 1932, he waged a 
successful battle for a seat in the New York State Assembly, then-considered a part-
time job, winning as a Republican against a Democratic incumbent, despite F.D.R.’s 
landslide victory that same year.153 After five successful political campaigns and five 
years in the Assembly, Brownell stepped down and became the general counsel for 
the World’s Fair of 1939-1940.154 Shortly thereafter, in 1941, Brownell was asked 
by Thomas Dewey, then-District Attorney of Manhattan, to run Edgar Nathan, Jr.’s 
campaign for Manhattan borough president, which he did successfully.155  
                                                        
150 John W. Sloan, The Management and Decision-Making Style of President Eisenhower, Presidential 
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 2, Eisenhower Centennial Issue (Spring, 1990) pp. 295-313 
151 Greenstein 85. 
152 Jim Newton, Eisenhower: The White House Years 49. 
153 Brownell 23. 
154 Ibid. 31. 
155 Ibid. 36. 
 62 
In 1942, Brownell continued on to successfully manage Dewey’s 1942 
campaign for New York governor, and subsequently served as a key aide to Dewey 
and as an appointed member of the New York State Judicial Council, a group of 
judges tasked with recommending measures to improve the administration of the 
New York State court system.156 Brownell then took the reins of the Republican 
National Convention from 1944 until 1946, and oversaw Gov. Dewey’s two failed 
presidential campaigns in 1944 and 1948.157 Throughout his political career, 
Brownell had established himself as what Time Magazine would call “the cleanup 
man.”158 He was regarded as “the best political strategist of his party,” and was 
known for remaining behind-the-scenes, preferring to be holed up in a backroom 
somewhere, directing campaigns and offering political advice.159 
 After he successfully secured Eisenhower’s nomination at the 1952 Chicago 
Convention from the confines of his Conrad Hilton Hotel room, though, he packed 
his bags and returned to New York to continue working at his law firm, knowing his 
management of Dewey’s 1948 defeat would preclude him from taking an active role 
in Eisenhower’s campaign. Some may find it peculiar that Eisenhower placed his 
trust in a man who had previously managed two failed presidential campaigns, but 
the fact remains that no one had more political connections and was more capable 
at working the GOP delegates than Brownell. Despite his past failures, Brownell was 
an expert in American politics where Eisenhower was not, and as previously noted, 
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he knew when to cede responsibility to more capable subordinates.160 Through his 
success at securing the nomination, he had made his mark on Eisenhower, who was 
“tremendously impressed” by Brownell’s judgment and equanimity, and who ended 
many post-nomination strategy conferences by saying, “Let’s ask Herb.”161  Shortly 
thereafter, Brownell returned to the campaign and served as one of Eisenhower’s 
top political aides. 
By the time Brownell rose to the rank of U.S. Attorney General and close 
advisor to President Eisenhower, he had established himself as a highly competent 
and politically savvy “fixer,” of sorts. Eisenhower’s admiration of Brownell was also 
quite palpable, having praised him in the middle of his first year in office, as a man 
of “consummate honesty, incapable of an unethical practice,” a “lawyer of the first 
rank,” and “an outstanding leader.”162 Eisenhower would go on to pay a compliment 
to Brownell in a way he rarely, if ever, did to others, saying he was “perfectly 
confident that he (Brownell) would make an outstanding President of the United 
States.”163  Thus, it is no surprise that Eisenhower entrusted Brownell with 
considerable independence in compiling shortlists for prospective judicial 
nominees, considering the degree to which he held Brownell in such high esteem. 
The president naturally expected Brownell to initiate the decision-making process 
for all vacancies – it involved a deep understanding of the law and the courts, as well 
as the political knowhow of getting a nominee through senatorial confirmation.164  
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What did come as a surprise, though, was how Brownell botched the 
appointments he was tasked with. This, according to some Court historians, such as 
David Yalof, rests on Eisenhower’s imposition of a set of excessively rigorous 
criteria that greatly restricted Brownell’s ability to select prospective nominees.165 
In fact, a heavy reliance on a predetermined set of criteria was quite characteristic 
of Eisenhower’s use of selectively delegating authority. One kind of selective 
delegation he practiced before and during his presidency consisted of assigning a 
clearly defined mission to an able subordinate who, in effect, would become more of 
a deputy than a delegate.166 
 By the time that the Minton vacancy occurred, Eisenhower had already come 
up with a set of criteria that prospective judicial nominees would have to meet, and 
by which Brownell and his deputy, William Rogers, were bound. Eisenhower was no 
stranger to appointments, and as Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces, he had 
utilized a similar method of personnel selection, delegating the bulk of staff 
appointments to his Chief of Staff, Walter Bedell Smith, who was to operate 
independently under a set of loose criteria.167 In arriving at the particular criteria 
for Supreme Court nominees, Eisenhower drew largely from his rudimentary 
political sense and life experiences. For example, learning from his “mistake” of 
nominating Warren, he henceforth required all prospective nominees to have 
previous judicial experience, believing such service would “provide an inkling of his 
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[the nominee’s] philosophy.”168 Although this seems to suggest that Warren hid his 
political views prior to his confirmation, in reality, no one had bothered to ask him 
of his views and question his constitutional jurisprudence. In theory, what 
Eisenhower was now instructing Brownell was to look deeply into any prospective 
nominee’s record and try to discern from judicial opinions, what the political views 
of that individual were, although it seems as though this was never carried out in 
practice, for one reason or another. 
 Eisenhower continued the process inaugurated by Truman of consulting 
with the American Bar Association on nominees for lower courts, and became the 
first president to submit his Supreme Court nominees to the ABA for formal 
vetting.169 As part of this arrangement, Eisenhower agreed to appoint no one unless 
that individual was “enthusiastically recommended by the American Bar 
Association,” and in return, the ABA agreed to discontinue its practice of suggesting 
names of its own in advance of being asked by the administration to evaluate a 
particular candidate.170 The President also required that prior to any official 
announcement, the FBI would have to perform a confidential check to determine 
that there was “nothing in [a candidate’s] record which could be brought up to 
diminish his effectiveness as a judge.”171  
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 In addition to instituting these new practices, as early as 1954, Eisenhower 
also required of his nominees that they be younger than sixty-two years of age.172 
He saw this as an important requirement because he understood the need to have 
young judges who would be able to remain on the Court for many years after he 
would leave the White House. Ideally, Eisenhower preferred “a number of 
outstanding jurists in the low 50’s.”173 After the Warren appointment, Eisenhower 
came to see the need for prior experience on the bench, a requirement he imposed 
on future prospective nominees.174 He no longer believed that a “statesman of 
national stature” was the best fit for a Supreme Court justice, arguing that it would 
be “completely futile to try and use a Supreme Court vacancy as a mere reward for 
long and brilliant service.”175 Eisenhower, the military man, also favored elevating 
judges from the ranks of federal appellate courts and state supreme courts – such a 
system of hierarchal promotion from within, made the most sense to him.176 In this 
context, Brownell struggled to find nominees who could match the highly restrictive 
set of criteria imposed on him by the President.  
 Much like the story surrounding Warren’s nomination, the details behind 
Brennan’s nomination are shrouded in rumor and myth. It is often said of the 
Brennan nomination that it was an accident, a mistake, and the result of a haphazard 
vetting process. In reality, the story is more complicated than that, and reflects a 
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deliberate intention on the part of Eisenhower and Brownell to use the Minton 
vacancy to score some political points in the weeks leading up to Eisenhower’s 
reelection bid. That Brennan was a state judge from New Jersey, a Catholic, a 
Democrat, and well under sixty-two, made him an ideal nominee for Eisenhower 
and Brownell. 
 The story may be traced back several months before the vacancy even 
became realized, to the Attorney General’s Conference on Court Congestion and 
Delays in Litigation, which took place in May, 1956.177 Brownell called upon his 
close friend, and noted administrator, New Jersey Chief Justice Vanderbilt, to deliver 
a keynote address at the conference. Having already accepted Brownell’s offer and 
unexpectedly being detained with other matters, Vanderbilt sent Brennan, his 
colleague on the New Jersey Supreme Court, as a replacement, or so the story goes. 
On the second day of the conference, Brennan delivered a rousing address outlining 
New Jersey’s experience with court reform. In Brownell’s words, the address “made 
the conference a success,” and it was the beginning of a long “friendship” between 
the two men.178  
It has been said that Vanderbilt called Brennan at the last minute as a 
substitute, and that Brennan had merely read from Vanderbilt’s prepared notes. His 
subsequent Supreme Court nomination, the story continues, was a mistake because 
it was based on a false impression created by Brennan’s remarks at the conference, 
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which were really those of Chief Justice Vanderbilt.179 If the story were true, the 
nomination may have been a literal mistake.  
However, there is ample evidence to suggest that Brennan had, indeed, 
prepared the remarks himself. Robert Seaver, then Assistant Deputy Attorney 
General, who was tasked with doing most of the staff work for the conference, has 
since recalled that while Brownell floated Vanderbilt’s name as a possible speaker, 
there was never serious consideration of Vanderbilt’s participation in the 
conference because he was “too ill.”180 If that is the case, it is unlikely that he would 
have even prepared a speech and thus highly implausible that Brennan delivered a 
speech ghostwritten by his colleague. However, there is also the distinct possibility 
that Vanderbilt, who as Chief Justice was tasked with additional administrative 
responsibilities, had standard remarks on matters pertaining to judicial reform, and 
that Brennan, in drafting his speech, relied on many of his colleague’s ideas.  
Though Brennan’s remarks were barely ideological and touched solely on 
administrative issues on court congestion, Brownell erroneously believed that they 
had seemed markedly conservative.181 Indeed, there is reason to suggest that 
Brownell entirely misinterpreted Brennan’s address. When Brennan spoke about 
the need for court reform, specifically for processes such as pretrial depositions that 
would speed litigation, Brownell mistook him for the type of judge who would not 
entertain technical arguments about constitutionality, especially in criminal 
matters. In reality, though, Brennan’s views on this matter were quite clear, with his 
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advocacy for pretrial disposition stemming from his desire to secure as many rights 
for defendants in criminal proceedings as possible. Just a few months prior to the 
Justice Department conference, he offered a vehement condemnation of the 
practices employed by Sen. Joseph McCarthy’s Permanent Investigations 
Subcommittee, telling an audience at the Monmouth Rotary Club,  
A system of inquisition on mere suspicion or gossip 
without independent proofs tending to show guilt is 
innately abhorrent to us. The power to extract answers 
will beget a forgetfulness of the just limitations of 
power…But there are hopeful signs in recent events that 
we have set things aright…it is indeed reason for pure 
joy and relief that at long last our collective conscience 
has sickened of the excesses and is demanding the 
adoption of permanent and lasting reforms to curb 
investigatory abuse…182 
 
Once on the Court, Brennan was known as a champion of individual liberties, and 
judging from statements like these, this could have certainly been expected. 
Evidently, though, Brownell failed to see this in Brennan, as he failed to take heed of 
his unambiguously liberal judicial philosophy and political views.  
Interestingly, Brownell seems to have also placed an emphasis on 
administrative issues as a prerequisite for someone to be considered for a Supreme 
Court appointment. While this certainly seems to have been the case with Warren, 
who was being considered for the Chief Justiceship, the preoccupation with 
administrative matters can hardly be justified when considering someone for 
associate justice nominee, as was the case with Brennan. This, once again, seems to 
imply that Brownell may have completely misunderstood the role and importance 
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of Supreme Court justices, and that perhaps he was not the politically savvy 
operator Eisenhower believed him to be.  
Whatever the case might be, while Brennan’s celebrated address served to 
introduce him to Brownell, demographics and electoral politics played a far larger 
role in the nomination. According to notes taken by Eisenhower’s personal 
secretary, Ann C. Whitman, within minutes of hearing of the Minton vacancy, 
Eisenhower phoned Brownell and spoke of his desire to appoint a “very good 
Catholic, even a conservative Democrat,” so as to reinforce his non-partisan image 
right before the election.183 The seeds for this idea, though, were sowed well before 
any such vacancy existed, when Francis Cardinal Spellman, the Archbishop of New 
York, visited Eisenhower. Spellman, who at times had been referred to as the 
“American Pope,” wielded an enormous amount of power and influence in 
conservative and Republican circles, and was not afraid to use it.184  
Spellman had visited Eisenhower in late 1954 in the wake of Justice Jackson’s 
death and reminded him that there had not been a Catholic on the bench since 
Justice Frank Murphy’s death in 1949.185 According to Bernard Shanley, Special 
Counsel to Eisenhower, Spellman wanted to see a Catholic appointed to the 
Supreme Court upon the next vacancy.186 Spellman was quoted as saying, “Mr. 
President, [i]t isn’t that I want a Catholic on the Supreme Court…I want someone 
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who will represent the interests and views of the Catholic Church.”187 With an eye 
towards the impending midterm elections, Eisenhower would have liked to use his 
second vacancy to appease Catholic voters, an increasingly critical constituency.188 
At the time, though, Brownell had already settled on Harlan, and there was no 
convincing him otherwise, which seems strange considering who the real decision-
maker ought to be. Now, with another opportunity to appoint someone to the bench, 
Eisenhower would be sure to honor the wishes of the Archbishop, especially at a 
time when he needed the votes and the support of one of the most politically active 
American religious figure in modern times. 
 The 1956 presidential election did not worry the President much, though. He 
was the heavy favorite to win, and he knew it, opting to forego the traditional and 
exhaustive process of traveling across the country that had marked the ’52 effort.189 
Instead, he campaigned from the White House, preferring to employ advertisements 
at the expense of making personal appearances.190  However, shortly after the 
California primary, Eisenhower had undergone major abdominal surgery, which 
served to cast doubt on his overall health and his ability to live through a second 
term.191 Suddenly, the attention was taken off President Eisenhower and cast onto 
Vice President Nixon and the likelihood of Nixon having to serve out the duration of 
Eisenhower’s term if his condition worsened. On the issue of Eisenhower’s 
deteriorating health and Nixon’s qualifications, many Democrats believed Stevenson 
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could win.192 Nevertheless, Eisenhower largely ignored the campaign to unseat him, 
although to be sure, he did have some areas of weakness, among them, his relatively 
mediocre standing among Catholic Democrats. 
 Notwithstanding the historical record that seems to indicate that voters pay 
little attention to a president’s Supreme Court appointments, electoral politics were 
a large motivating force behind the Brennan nomination.193 At a White House 
meeting held in late September, 1956, to discuss the progress of the presidential 
campaign, it became apparent that Catholic voters, a swing constituency who had 
voted for Eisenhower in 1952, were a top priority for his reelection prospects.194 
The “Catholic vote” was listed as the second of seven major items on the political 
agenda for that day.195 Around the same time as Eisenhower and Brownell were 
canvassing possible nominees, Adlai Stevenson, the Democratic candidate for 
President, was set to begin a six-day tour of seven electorally vote-rich Northeastern 
states, including New Jersey and Massachusetts. Brownell, an astute political 
observer, relished the prospect of making Brennan’s nomination public just as 
Stevenson was making his way through New Jersey and other states, where 
Catholics comprised a large share of the electorate.196 In Massachusetts, Democratic 
Sen. John F. Kennedy, an Irish-Catholic, was making inroads with Catholic voters 
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who had voted for Eisenhower in 1952, and Eisenhower and his advisors saw the 
Brennan nomination, as an opportunity to retain this core constituency.197  
 To be sure, it seems as though Brennan’s entire nomination was predicated 
on his record as a good Catholic, and not on his judicial philosophy. When the search 
began for a Catholic judge, Brownell and his deputy, William Rogers, immediately 
floated Brennan’s name, impressed by his speech at the Justice Department 
conference several months earlier. In their early conversations, Brownell seemed to 
argue that Brennan’s religious observance was of paramount importance. “I want to 
make sure he’s really a member of the Catholic Church,” he told Rogers.198 Rogers 
called Cardinal Spellman to verify Brennan’s “fitness” as a practicing Catholic and 
whether he would be acceptable to Spellman. In turn, Spellman called Brennan’s 
parish priest and reported back to Brownell that he had attended Mass virtually 
every week and that Brennan was a legitimate practicing Catholic.199 Brownell 
interpreted Spellman’s findings as a sign of his approval of Brennan, and with that, 
he arranged for Brennan to come to Washington to meet with the President.  
 Ironically, Spellman was a staunch conservative who would have detested 
Brennan’s future liberal opinions, yet without Spellman’s crucial role in the 
appointment process, Brennan might never have made it to the High Court. Equally 
mystifying is how Spellman only seemed concerned with the amount of time 
Brennan attended Mass and did not question his beliefs, though presumably, he 
interpreted Brennan’s record of going to weekly Mass as indicative of him being in 
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accord with traditional Catholic dogma and he probably thought Brownell would vet 
him to ensure his views were acceptable. For Eisenhower, the meeting with Brennan 
was just a formality, as he, too, assumed that Brownell had already asked the 
important questions. After a short twenty minutes, and without even doing as much 
as consulting with New Jersey’s two senators or its governor, Eisenhower offered 
Brennan the job.200  In reality, though, the only “important” question Brownell had 
bothered to ask was how religious Brennan actually was and how often he attended 
Mass.  
 Catholic groups were not the only ones whom Eisenhower sought to placate 
with his selection of Brennan. The Association of State Court Judges and the 
Conference of Chief Justices of the State Courts claimed that the “existing Court was 
weakened” because none of the sitting justices had any experience on a state 
court.201 In fact, since Justice Benjamin Cardozo had died in 1938, there had not 
been a single justice who had any judicial experience at the state court level. 
Accordingly, the groups believed that the Court lacked a proper understanding of 
the states’ position in federal-state relationships.202 For Eisenhower’s reelection 
prospects, it was important to embrace state courts because it served to reinforce 
his credentials as a Republican, who believed in strong states and was suspicious of 
centralization. Thus, Eisenhower was able to satisfy these groups’ grievances by 
nominating Brennan, a Catholic Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey. 
                                                        
200 Eisler 90. 
201 Brownell 180. 
202 Ibid. 
 75 
Furthermore, Eisenhower had run for President in 1952 against his 
Democratic predecessor’s practice of turning Supreme Court appointments into 
mere party-handouts. However, two years into his presidency, both of his Supreme 
Court nominations and all but a handful of lower court nominations had gone to 
fellow Republicans.203 In order to fulfill his prior campaign promises, he believed 
that his next appointment ought to be a Democrat, preferably of the “anti-New Deal” 
ilk.204 This, too, Eisenhower believed, would serve to bolster his nonpartisan, 
middle-of-the-road image—a critical perception that contributed to his widespread 
appeal and popularity.205  
It is interesting to note that Eisenhower selected his third nomination just a 
month before the 1956 presidential election. While Eisenhower was extremely 
popular, he may have feared that his deteriorating health and the possibility of his 
Vice President, Nixon, having to succeed him, might imperil his reelection prospects, 
and he felt he needed a boost.206  Eisenhower had defeated Stevenson, the 
Democratic candidate, once before, in 1952, but the political climate had changed in 
the wake of several pro-civil rights Supreme Court decisions. Stevenson was walking 
a fine line on the issue of civil rights, attempting to satisfy the general national 
sentiment in favor of expanding civil rights without alienating Southern voters, 
whom Eisenhower believed were integral to his reelection efforts.207 In such an 
environment, it would have been reasonable for Eisenhower to postpone 
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nominating someone until after he was safely reelected, especially since the 
Supreme Court was at the heart of the renewed civil rights debate. Nonetheless, 
Eisenhower used the vacancy to score critical political points by appealing to 
moderate Democrats, Catholics, and Northerners with his selection of Brennan, a 
respected figure in the electorally important state of New Jersey.  
Whatever the case may be, William J. Brennan, only fifty years old at the time, 
was sworn in as a recess appointment on October 16, 1956, his nomination having 
been made public just two weeks earlier.208 A few weeks later, Eisenhower handedly 
defeated Stevenson for a second time, winning 57% of the popular vote and carrying 
forty-one states in the Electoral College, including New Jersey and Massachusetts.209 
Eisenhower also received 54% of the Catholic vote, a six percent increase from 
1952, and until today, a level of support from Catholics that Republican presidential 
candidates have matched only twice, in the 1972 and 1984 landslide victories.210 
Though it is clear that Eisenhower won big among Catholic voters, it might be 
difficult to ascertain the total effect that Brennan’s nomination had on the outcome 
of the election. After several weeks, the Senate confirmed Brennan on March 19, 
1957 without much dissent.211  
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III. A Fourth Appointment 
 President Eisenhower’s second term had not yet been a week old when he 
received a letter from Associate Justice Stanley Reed on January 28, 1957, informing 
the President of his intent to retire.212 Reed, from then-segregated Kentucky, was 
viewed as a discordant member of the Court, who often took a hardline on civil 
rights issues, an increasingly prominent area for the Supreme Court at that time. It is 
said that Reed initially wanted to write a dissenting opinion in Brown v. Board of 
Education, before Warren was able to convince him otherwise. Reed ultimately 
decided to retire because he feared his stances on civil rights would taint the 
“impartiality of the federal judiciary.”213 With Reed’s decision, Eisenhower was 
given his fourth opportunity to make a lasting impact on the composition of the 
Supreme Court. Unfortunately, it is generally understood that Eisenhower dropped 
the ball in this regard; his selection of Charles Evans Whittaker is widely viewed by 
scholars of the Court as an unmitigated failure. Whereas Warren and Brennan may 
be seen as having views counter to those of their nominator, the Whittaker 
nomination was a blunder for other reasons. This is the story of Eisenhower’s fourth 
appointment to the Supreme Court, and perhaps one of the single greatest mistakes 
of his presidency.  
 President Eisenhower and his point man on judicial appointments, Brownell, 
first met Whittaker three years earlier, in 1954, when they considered him for a 
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vacancy on the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri.214 
The vacancy arose when Chief Judge Albert Reeves, who was eighty years old at the 
time and had served on the court for over thirty years, decided to retire. As F.D.R. 
and Truman selected Democrats for four out of every five federal nominations, 
Reeves, a Harding appointee, was waiting for a Republican president to replace him 
with a fellow Republican judge.215 In fact, Eisenhower had made it a goal of restoring 
numerical parity between the two parties to the federal bench. Prior to his election, 
over eighty percent of federal judges had been appointed by Democratic 
administrations, and Eisenhower hoped to achieve a better balance by appointing 
more Republican judges.216  According to Brownell’s deputy, William Rogers, for 
Eisenhower, “getting the best men meant for all practical purposes, getting the best 
Republicans.”217 While this philosophy seems to fly in the face of his earlier critiques 
of past administrations’ policies of awarding judgeships on the basis of “patronage” 
and ”partisanship,” Eisenhower strongly felt that he needed to return balance to the 
federal judiciary. It is important to note, though, that at the time, there was no 
definitive political philosophy that was associated with the Republican Party, and 
that Eisenhower’s preference for Republican judges did not necessarily translate 
into them having certain views. After all, Warren had been a Republican governor, 
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but certainly his views on the Court were anything but conservative or Republican, 
for that matter.  
Whittaker, a successful corporate lawyer working for a large firm in Missouri 
that served many clients in the Kansas City area, had a reputation of being an 
outstanding trial and appellate attorney, a real “lawyer’s lawyer.”218 He came highly 
recommended by Eisenhower’s brother, Arthur, a Kansas City banker and close 
friend of Whittaker’s, Roy Roberts, Republican publisher of the Kansas City Star, and 
Senators Harry Darby and Frank Carlson, both Republicans from Kansas.219 Since 
Whitaker had never held public office before, Brownell had Justice Department 
officials contact Whittaker’s law firm to confirm that he was, indeed, a Republican. 
The only political contribution his colleagues could point to was a two hundred 
dollar contribution Whittaker had made to the Republican Party in 1952, and 
evidently, that satisfied the Justice Department and Eisenhower.220 Largely based on 
his party affiliation and on the recommendations, Whittaker was nominated and 
swiftly confirmed by the Senate on July 6, 1954.221 
Much in the way that Eisenhower and Brownell could have expected, 
Whittaker was a great addition to the federal bench. He quickly cleared the dockets 
of the case backlog that had developed prior to his appointment, he had forty-seven 
of his opinions published, and he worked long hours, six days a week, and never 
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took a vacation.222 Whittaker was passionate about his new position and his passion 
drove him to excel, working hard, without rest, much to the exclusion of other 
activities. While Whittaker generally enjoyed his time on the district court, calling it 
a “perfect delight,” one criminal case that he presided over left an indelible mark on 
his conscience and psyche.223  
The high profile trial of Arthur Ross Brown, a thirty-year-old crane operator 
from California accused of kidnapping and murdering Wilma Allen, wife of William 
Allen, Jr., president of the Allen Chevrolet Company in Kansas City, presented 
Whittaker with his first opportunity to sentence another man to death. Brown had 
confessed to the crimes and the facts of the case were uncomplicated, yet it was by 
far Whittaker’s most difficult criminal case as a district court judge.224  Upon 
sentencing the man to death, Whittaker became noticeable morose. Clyde Rayburn, 
his clerk at the time recalled, “[w]hen the man was executed, you could tell it 
bothered Judge Whittaker…[h]e was different in the office after that.”225 This case 
sheds some light on the difficulties Whittaker may have encountered on the 
Supreme Court, where he was forced to make similar decisions when another 
person’s life hung in the balance.226 
Nevertheless, Whittaker did a fine job on the bench and as a sign of 
Eisenhower’s approval, Whittaker was elevated within just two years to a vacancy 
that arose on the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in June, 
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1956.227 Whittaker was very content with his seat on the district court, and was 
reluctant to accept the job but felt compelled to accept out of a strong sense of duty. 
“I am moving up to the court of appeals with mixed emotions,” he told reporters, “I 
will miss the more active role of a district judge.”228  The Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals operated at a much slower pace, and the nature of the three-judge panel 
was conducive to long delays, which frustrated Whittaker. He felt isolated working 
from his chambers in Kansas City, where he spent most of his time doing 
research.229 
As an appellate judge, though, Whittaker continued to impress his colleagues 
with his diligence and efficiency; he managed to produce eleven opinions and one 
dissenting opinion in his eight months on the court.230 Of the total sixty-three lower 
court opinions he wrote, few were appealed, and none reversed. Moreover, some of 
Whittaker’s lower court opinions influenced the direction of later appeals court 
decisions, and altered the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.231 It is thus no 
wonder than Eisenhower and Brownell felt comfortable nominating Whittaker to 
the Supreme Court, when Justice Reed’s intention to retire became known. 
Fresh off his inauguration, Eisenhower no longer felt compelled to use his 
Supreme Court appointments to return favors, as some say he had in the case of 
Warren, or to satisfy core constituencies, as he had done in the case of Brennan. Nor 
did he have to make any further grand displays of bipartisanship by nominating a 
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Democrat. The Warren Court had since handed down several controversial 
decisions regarding school desegregation, criminal law, and labor relations that 
sparked widespread criticism and backlash against Eisenhower. 232  Having 
experienced such a bevy of liberal and progressive decisions coming from the Court 
after his first three appointments, Eisenhower was determined to select a moderate 
conservative as his next appointment. In a way, his approach to judicial 
appointments had changed, undoubtedly stemming from his prior experiences with 
nominating justices Warren and Brennan to the Court.  
Whittaker was a conservative Republican, which appealed to both 
Eisenhower and Brownell, and he seemed to meet nearly every criterion that 
Eisenhower wanted in a nominee.233 He had judicial experience as a federal judge, 
albeit only for a relatively short time. At fifty-six years old, he fit well within 
Eisenhower’s requirement that all prospective nominees be younger than sixty-two. 
Demographically, he was from the Midwest, an area significantly underrepresented 
on the Court.234 He also told a remarkable rags-to-riches, Horatio Algers-type story 
that Eisenhower and Brownell both admired.  
As a young boy growing up in a rural town on the border of Kansas, 
Eisenhower’s home state, and Missouri, Whittaker attended school until his mother 
died, when he was only sixteen years old. He dropped out of high school to work on 
his father’s farm, in order to save money to continue his education. He applied to the 
Kansas City School of Law and was accepted, despite his failure to complete high 
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school, and worked during the days as an office boy for a big law firm, attending 
classes by night. He graduated at the top of his class, passing the Missouri state bar 
examination before he even finished law school, and went on to become a senior 
partner at the firm he had once worked for as a mere office boy.235  
Eisenhower had met with Whittaker personally when he was considering 
him for the nomination to the U.S. Court of Appeals. He was impressed by his 
credentials, and noted that his legal philosophy was more conservative than any of 
his prior judicial appointees. 236  Whittaker’s exceptional record aside, his   
nomination might never have occurred if not for the tenacious effort on the part of 
Roy Roberts of the Kansas City Star.237 Roberts, who played an equally pivotal role in 
Whittaker’s prior appointments to the federal bench, had grown fond of Whittaker 
during his successful representation of the Star. Roberts enjoyed direct channels to 
Brownell and Eisenhower, and his newspaper had been a loyal supporter of the 
Eisenhower administration and the Republican Party. While some consideration 
was given to others, such as Judge Elbert Tuttle of the Fifth Circuit, according to 
interviews given by Brownell, with no obvious frontrunner emerging from the pack, 
Roberts’ sponsorship of Whittaker was critical to his ultimate nomination 
(Eisenhower feared the political ramifications of nominating Tuttle, a Southern 
moderate, who had loyally enforced the recent desegregation decision).238 
On March 2, 1957, Eisenhower formally nominated Charles Evans Whittaker 
as an Associate Justice, just a little over a month after Justice Reed had informed the 
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president of his wishes to retire.239 Confirmation hearings began on March 18 with 
only one witness opposed, Fyke Farmer.240 Farmer, a Tennessee attorney famous for 
his last-ditch effort to stay the executions of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, who had 
been accused and convicted of being Communist spies during the mid-twentieth 
century, took issue with a decision rendered by Whittaker as a federal district court 
judge. Farmer was representing a client, Horace B. Davis, a professor at the 
University of Kansas City, who was fired for his refusal to answer questions posed to 
him by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee and university trustees 
concerning his possible affiliation with the Communist Party. Davis had brought suit 
claiming he had tenure and could only be fired for “adequate cause,” which he 
maintained did not include a refusal to answer questions concerning his alleged 
Communist ties. Whittaker dismissed the complaint, finding that Davis’s refusal to 
answer constituted “adequate cause.”241 Although Brownell remained moderate-to-
liberal on civil rights issues, he took a hard line on communism, and publicly 
challenged some of the Warren Court’s decisions on law enforcement that, in his 
view, unduly protected communists.242  
Certainly, Brownell was not bothered by Whittaker’s decision in the Davis v. 
University of Kansas City case, and apparently, neither was the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, who went on to unanimously recommend Whittaker for confirmation.243 
Shortly thereafter, on March 25, 1957, Whittaker was confirmed by the Senate and 
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was set to take his seat as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, promising to be 
a successful and impactful justice. Over the past three years, it had already 
confirmed Whittaker twice and to question him now would be the equivalent of 
admitting they had made a mistake. Furthermore, he had no real blemishes on his 
relatively brief record as a judge. Beyond that, the Senate had become very passive 
in its confirmation of justices during this time. Prior to 1957, every Supreme Court 
nominee since 1930 had been confirmed; the Senate approved every one of the 
seventeen appointments, including every justice then sitting on the Court.244 
Much in the way that Whittaker was reluctant to accept the Court of Appeals 
nomination, he was similarly conflicted about going to the Supreme Court. With 
each promotion up the judicial ladder, he found himself further removed from his 
home and the pleasures that made him want to become a lawyer in the first place.245  
He was suddenly thrust into the national spotlight, certainly an unnerving 
experience for anyone, but he felt unprepared, as his nomination came completely 
unexpectedly to him. Remarking to a reporter at the press conference announcing 
his selection, he said, “I am almost rendered numb…I was just stunned. I had no 
indication. I had heard rumors that I might be appointed, but I had no reason to take 
them seriously.”246 After all, the only other time a Supreme Court justice had sat 
previously as both a district court and later appeals court judge, it had taken fifteen 
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years and three presidents to move him through all three levels. Whittaker had 
completed the process in less than three years.247 
Whittaker joined the Court in the midst of its 1956 session, with Justice 
Reed’s retirement occurring during the mid-winter break in 1957. The Supreme 
Court had come under considerable scrutiny in the wake of some highly 
controversial decisions concerning school desegregation and the politics of the Red 
Scare. Whittaker felt keenly the awesome power of this new responsibility, he was 
immediately overwhelmed by it, and he did not want it. Shortly after his ascendance 
to the High Court, he told an audience in his hometown, “To make a mistake in a 
court whose decision is ultimately the law of the land is to make a mistake that will 
haunt the court member forever after.” It was this added element of finality to his 
work that made Whittaker so uneasy.    
Furthermore, he did not want to leave his home and his family and all that he 
knew behind.248 Whittaker had deep roots in Kansas City, both personally and 
professionally, and he was forced to move to Washington, D.C., where he felt 
supremely out of place. Throughout his five-year stint on the Court, he returned to 
the Kansas City area as often as he could, as a way of replenishing his spirits. The 
visits provided him with an opportunity to relax and just be himself, something he 
apparently had a hard time doing in Washington. There, he felt that he never 
measured up to the other justices, whereas in Kansas City, he was the measure 
against which all the other lawyers were judged—the proverbial big fish in a small 
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pond.249 According to one of his former law associates, “The situation was not what 
he (Whittaker) expected. He did not realize the difference between his background 
and society in the East. He was not cultured in the eastern sense. He was shocked by 
what he found.”250 During the first three months in Washington, while the Court 
concluded its 1956 term, Whittaker lived “the lonesome life of a bachelor in a little 
apartment.”251 His wife, Winifred, remained in Kansas City and when his youngest 
son, Gary, graduated from high school in early June, he could not attend.252 
According to a Kansas City Star reporter, “Only Whittaker, his wife, and perhaps a 
few trusted friends [were] aware of the frustrations and disappointment, the sense 
of loneliness and homesickness that beset him at times after he took his seat on the 
bench.”253 
As a member of the Supreme Court, Whittaker was also thrust into a lifestyle 
to which he was clearly unaccustomed. He was now a member of Washington’s 
politically privileged elite and feeling outclassed, Whittaker remained a perennial 
outsider, choosing to decline offers to countless parties, dinners, and events. 
Whereas some of his colleagues had been regulars on the Beltway scene and had 
worked closely in presidential administrations and within Congress, Whittaker was 
a complete stranger from the Midwest. According to one of Justice Frankfurter’s 
clerks, Whittaker “labored under serious feelings of inferiority.”254  He would soon 
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confide in one of his own clerks, Alan Kohn, that he felt as if he had “sold himself 
down the river for a pot of porridge.”255  
 In his work on the Court, he felt dwarfed by the robust personalities of his 
colleagues, who possessed far greater experience in state and national politics than 
he. The range of experience, education, and depth of knowledge that his colleagues 
brought to the Court left Whittaker overawed. With the lone exception of Justice 
Black, all had university diplomas in addition to their law degrees. Three of his 
colleagues, Frankfurter, Burton, and Brennan, had graduated from Harvard Law 
School, considered one of the best in the nation.256 Frankfurter had also taught 
classes at Harvard Law, and Douglas had taught at Yale and Columbia Law School, 
his alma mater. In comparison, Whittaker felt almost embarrassed by his legal 
education. Once, Justice Douglas, who was notorious for being insensitive and cruel 
to colleagues, was overheard during a heated conference discussion as saying in 
reference to Whittaker, “What do you expect from a hick lawyer born in Troy, 
Kansas, and coming from the Kansas City School of Law?”257 Serving in the shadow 
of colleagues who had proven themselves as fine jurists, scholars, and statesmen, he 
felt like he was undeserving of his promotion to the Court. When he first arrived at 
the Court, Justice Black asked him how he felt about being a justice, to which 
Whittaker replied, “I am scared to death.”258  Similarly, on the same day, he 
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remarked to two of Warren’s clerks, “I have never felt so inadequate in my life.”259 In 
short, Whittaker suffered from an extraordinary inferiority complex that left him 
with profound feelings of inadequacy. 
For Whittaker, one of the most troubling aspects of his new job was having to 
adjust to the daunting prospect that his decisions would have profound impacts on 
people’s lives. Twice during the first three months on the Court, his vote contributed 
to five to four majorities, leaving him to believe that his vote had been the only one 
that mattered.260 Additionally, on four separate cases during his first three months 
on the Court, the justices had split four to four, resigning Whittaker to become the 
tiebreaker. Whittaker, who felt utterly unable to bring himself to cast his tie-
breaking vote, asked that the cases be held over until the following term to give 
himself more time to weigh the arguments – the same arguments that his colleagues 
had no trouble deciding.261  One of these cases, Green v. United States, involved 
upholding a lower court’s conviction, and Whittaker found himself unwilling, or 
mentally unable, to send another man to the electric chair, as he had regrettably 
done as a district court judge. 
At the conclusion of his first few months on the Court, the pressures of his 
new job started to take a toll on Whittaker’s health. Whittaker became highly 
agitated, and he suffered from severe bouts of anxiety, even depression. It had 
become apparent to his colleagues that something was terribly wrong with the new 
justice, leading Justice Burton to record in his diary, “Justice Whittaker has been on 
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the edge of a nervous breakdown but hopes to finish the term and then 
recuperate.”262  One of Burton’s clerks, Roger Cramton, had communicated to a 
friend at the end of the 1956 term that Whittaker was so overawed and insecure 
after his first three months on the Court that it was unlikely he would last another 
year.263  
By the fall of 1957, Whittaker was under the care of a Kansas City physician 
to help him cope with acute anxiety and depression. When he returned to 
Washington for the 1957 term, he had also been taking sedatives to treat 
hypertension and insomnia.264 The drugs he was taking to help him cope with his 
health problems had severe side effects, which caused him to lose a lot of weight, 
and for the first time give the appearance that he was simply not well. Whittaker 
was also taking tranquilizers to help calm his nerves, and his correspondence with 
his physician seems to indicate that he was being overmedicated, which caused 
detrimental, even addictive effects.265 Whittaker was not himself, and his behavior 
became noticeably erratic. One of Whittaker’s former colleagues recalled how on a 
visit to Washington, Whittaker’s wife used to have to keep her hand on the steering 
wheel as Whittaker drove his car, evidence of his having difficulty concentrating.266 
Separately, one of his family members was at a local bar association meeting in 
Kansas City, when some in the audience had begun commenting on how Whittaker 
seemed to be drunk, although his appearance was more likely the result of his heavy 
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dependence on tranquilizers than being indicative of a drinking problem. Evidently, 
Whittaker’s feelings of inferiority started to impact his physical appearance and his 
mental health. 
About halfway through his time on the Court, though, Whittaker’s condition 
started to improve. Justice Potter Stewart’s arrival in October, 1958, meant that 
Whittaker was no longer the most junior associate justice. Although he personally, 
had conservative views, he belonged to neither the conservative nor liberal bloc on 
the Court, instead wavering between both sides, leaving him troubled about his 
undefined role on the Court. Like Whittaker, though, Stewart was neither a fixed 
member of either the liberal or conservative wings of the Court, and Whittaker no 
longer felt like the odd man out. 267  Additionally, Whittaker started to feel 
comfortable with writing his own separate opinions, and began to see that his 
opinions could sway the views of his colleagues. However, whereas other justices 
relied on their clerks to help draft opinions, Whittaker preferred to write his own 
opinions, which inevitably took its toll on the justice. He often labored intensely 
over his opinions, frequently causing delays for the Court, which frustrated his 
colleagues. Whittaker also habitually changed his mind and switched his votes, 
leading some of his colleagues to believe he was weak or indecisive.268  
On March 6, 1962, within five years of his elevation to the Supreme Court, 
Whittaker checked himself into the Walter Reed Army Hospital in Washington, 
citing “physical and mental exhaustion.”269 Subsequently, Whittaker notified Chief 
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Justice Warren of his intent to retire from his post, as his doctors had made clear to 
him that his return to the Court “would unduly jeopardize [his] future health.”270 
Perhaps, what is most bizarre about Whittaker’s tragic story is that once he 
returned to the private sector, where he took up employment with General Motors, 
he regained his complete health and spirits.271 
The story of Whittaker’s nomination and his time on the Court begs the 
question of how Brownell and Eisenhower could not have predicted Whittaker’s 
legacy as a failed justice. In their defense, there was little in Whittaker’s record that 
would suggest he would not be able to cope with the stress of being on the High 
Court. In Whittaker’s own view, it seems as though his move to the Supreme Court 
was premature, and he was ill prepared, physically and mentally, for the rigors of 
being a Supreme Court justice. Upon his retirement, he recounted the following 
baseball analogy, to an audience about his swift accession to the Court:  
 I was enabled to touch three bases in three years. I went to 
first on a walk, to second on a fielder’s choice, and on the 
second pitch thereafter, I was sacrificed to third. First 
base, the district court, being close to the dugout of the 
home team and its fans, was a perfect delight; second base, 
the United States Court of Appeals – particularly the 
Eighth Circuit – while a little more removed from the 
people, was a very quiet and comfortable position. But 
third base, I found truly to be, as the fans say, ‘the hot 
corner.’ Then came the most solemn quest for light that 
can proceed from the broodings of a human soul.272 
 
Certainly, Whittaker would have preferred to remain a district court judge his whole 
life, but unfortunately for him, Eisenhower and Brownell, and apparently his friend, 
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Roy Roberts, had other plans for him273. Whittaker is widely regarded among 
scholars of the Court as a mistake, and his legacy as a failed Supreme Court justice 
will remain a blemish on Eisenhower’s presidency.   
President Eisenhower went on to make his fifth, and final, appointment to 
the Court in October 1958, when Justice Harold H. Burton retired. In the fall of 1957, 
Brownell returned to his private practice and was replaced by Deputy Attorney 
General William Rogers, who would lead the search for the fifth nominee. On two 
separate occasions in early 1958, Whittaker had called Rogers complaining that he 
was too overwhelmed by his new position and that he wanted to quit.274 Rogers 
knew right away that Whittaker had been a mistake and would be certain to avoid 
any additional mistakes with the sole appointment he bore primary responsibility 
for. With the selection of Potter Stewart, whom Eisenhower had nominated just four 
years earlier to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, a repeat mistake was 
surely avoided.275 Stewart went on to serve as a progressive-conservative, much in 
the mold of his nominator, and voted against his more liberal colleagues in 
important decisions, such as Griswold v. Connecticut and Miranda v. Arizona.276 
Although Stewart reversed this course and sided with the majority in Roe v. Wade, 
Eisenhower would have certainly been pleased with his fifth appointment. 
In surveying Eisenhower’s five appointments to the Supreme Court between 
1953 and 1958, it is clear that he relied on a multitude of factors when looking for 
prospective nominees: he valued judicial experience, relative youthfulness, 
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somewhat of a shared legal and political philosophy, and a focus on electoral politics 
and demographics, such as the religious and geographical representativeness of the 
Court. Nevertheless, Eisenhower and his Attorney General, Herbert Brownell, 
clearly viewed three of the five appointments as mistakes. Were they really 
mistakes, though? Is Eisenhower’s assessment of his appointees accurate? Was he 
blindsided by the actions and decisions of the justices he himself had appointed, or 
could he have had reason to predict the future behaviors of the men he presumably 
selected with great care? The concluding section of this paper will delve into these 
questions to analyze, whether, in fact, Eisenhower’s “three greatest mistakes” were 
truly mistakes at all.  
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Mistakes and Consequences 
 
I. Conclusion 
 
  
 Chief Justice Earl Warren had been at the helm of the Supreme Court for 
sixteen years when he resigned in June 1969.277 At the conclusion of his tenure on 
the Court, it was apparent to all that he had left an indelible mark on American 
constitutional law, the likes of which had not been seen, perhaps, since Chief Justice 
John Marshall. The Warren Court forever changed the face of American politics and 
society by banning segregation in public schools, striking down prayer in the public 
schools, and securing greater rights and liberties for defendants in criminal 
proceedings, among a whole host of additional far-reaching decisions.  
One of the most reliable members on the Warren-led liberal bloc was Justice 
William Brennan, who sat on the Court for thirty-four years, only to step down in 
1990. Brennan was responsible for effecting widespread judicial and social change 
through his decisions on matters pertaining to legislative reapportionment, libel, 
obscenity, and affirmative action. Justice Whittaker served on the Court for a mere 
five years before he resigned in April 1962, in the wake of deteriorating health and 
after nearly suffering a complete mental breakdown.278  Together, these three 
justices comprise what some, including myself, have regarded as major blunders of 
the Eisenhower presidency. However, there seems to be little agreement among 
scholars as to whether the appointments were mistakes at all. 
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 For the sake of clarity, it is worthwhile to mention that Whittaker has been 
regarded as a wholly different sort of “mistake” than his fellow Eisenhower 
nominees. It has been deemed by history that Whittaker was a failed justice because 
of his brief time on the Court, and because of his inability to make any significant 
contributions to constitutional law. When Eisenhower allegedly spoke of the 
“biggest damned fool mistake” he ever made, he was apparently referring to his 
appointment of Warren and Brennan, and not Whittaker.279 Therefore, the ensuing 
discussion will focus on those two nominations and the two primary approaches 
that have been used in evaluating their appointments.  
 The most popular view is that Warren and Brennan somehow “changed” in 
their time on the Court and that their judicial behaviors, as embodied in their 
decisions and opinions, could not have been anticipated by Eisenhower and his 
Attorney General. This approach points to Warren’s stint as a district attorney and 
attorney general in California, during which he engaged in and endorsed the very 
prosecutorial practices that his Court would go on to so strongly condemn: extorting 
confessions, though not by physical violence; depriving indigents of counsel, though 
not at trial; bugging homes and offices and conducting illegal searches and seizures, 
although it has been offered that the unlawfully secured evidence was not used in 
trial.280 As attorney general, Warren was credited with leading the racist attack that 
resulted in Japanese-Americans being interned on the West Coast during World War 
II, and he often engaged in the kind of Red-baiting that characterized the McCarthy 
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era, which he would later go on to eschew.281 As governor, he successfully fought 
legislative reapportionment that would have brought his state closer to the “one 
man-one vote” formula that as Chief Justice, he believed should be imposed on all 
states. Some, such as Philip Kurland, have held that Warren the Chief Justice, 
unquestionably exhibited a very different set of values than did Warren the district 
attorney, or Warren the state attorney general, or even Warren the governor of 
California.  Kurland posits that Warren was transformed by the experiences he 
encountered on the Court, and that he underwent some changes in his worldview 
and his sense of jurisprudence.  
Although Brennan’s views on national issues were not quite as clear prior to 
his appointment, Brownell and his subordinates believed, albeit mistakenly, that he 
would take a tougher stand on matters of national security, and that he would not 
allow procedural problems to slow the fight against communism at home. According 
to Thomas Dewey, Brennan had been investigated “backwards and forwards” by the 
Eisenhower administration.282 Brownell similarly claims to have read “all his 
published opinions” before submitting Brennan’s name to the president.283 
However, as we shall see, Brennan’s liberal views were clear and unambiguous, and 
it is doubtful that Brownell would have been truly surprised with his Supreme Court 
decisions, had he actually bothered to read the earlier opinions. For understanding 
the Brennan appointment, we must therefore turn to an alternative explanation. 
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The second contrasting viewpoint posits that Brennan had not changed at all, 
and that any mistake in his appointment was the consequence of poor vetting on the 
part of Brownell. Supporting this theory is the wealth of evidence that suggests that 
the decisions handed down by Brennan were direct extensions of the type of man 
that he was prior to his appointment. At the time that Brennan’s appointment was 
announced, a New York Times profile referred to him as “a sound liberal of the 
highest personal character.”284  The same article cited then-Governor Robert 
Meyner of New Jersey, who offered, “I suspect his (Brennan’s) opinions will not be 
quite as ‘middle-of-the-road’ as some Republicans seem to think.”285 Similarly, a U.S. 
News and World Report article quoted a government official familiar with the 
nominee who referred to Brennan as a man “with a lot of progressive ideas.”286 
Perhaps no prediction of Brennan’s judicial record on the Court was more on 
point than that of J.L. Bernstein’s, published in the New Jersey Law Journal at the 
time the notice of appointment was made public. Bernstein, a prominent New Jersey 
lawyer, wrote, “We have a notion that Justice Brennan, son of a former labor leader, 
will become a valuable assistant to Chief Justice Warren, son of a former railroad 
mechanic…Judged by ability and industry and by the qualitative and quantitative 
estimate of his work in New Jersey, Brennan seems destined to join the libertarian 
group on the U.S. Supreme Court of Warren, Black, and Douglas.”287  Two questions 
immediately emerge. Firstly, if a New Jersey lawyer was able to ascertain this truth 
regarding Brennan’s likelihood to be a liberal justice, how can it be that Eisenhower 
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and Brownell, with all the resources that were available to them, failed to foresee 
this eventuality? Secondly, given Bernstein’s confidence about Brennan’s liberal 
bent, is it plausible that he underwent some change on the Court, and that 
Eisenhower and Brownell were right to consider him deviant in his decisions? It is 
quite clear that Brennan was as liberal a justice on his last day on the Court as he 
was on his first day, and that in appointing him, Eisenhower and Brownell should 
have anticipated the type of justice that he would become. 
With respect to Earl Warren, it has also been shown that his vetting was 
fairly nonexistent, Brownell only having had asked him his views on administrative 
issues pertaining to the federal judiciary. Perhaps, because of Warren’s prominence 
as a one-time presidential and vice-presidential candidate and popular and 
successful governor, they felt that a comprehensive vetting was unnecessary. It was 
likely assumed that for a figure like Warren to be in the public arena for such a long 
time and still to be well liked, though evidently not enough to move beyond the 
governorship, his views must be moderate and within the mainstream. Thus, 
Brownell and Eisenhower may have just assumed that Warren’s ideology and 
governing philosophy was acceptable enough as not to warrant a detailed vetting of 
his views, although as only time would tell, they were greatly mistaken. 
According to Kim Isaac Eisler, preeminent biographer of Justice Brennan, 
there is a yet a third viewpoint – a hybrid of the other two – which helps to explain 
both the Warren and Brennan nominations concomitantly. Eisler interpreted 
Eisenhower’s “mistake” comment in a slightly different and more nuanced manner, 
which led him to conclude that the appointments of Warren and Brennan were 
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indeed failures, but not because the justices underwent some kind of 
metamorphosis on the bench or because Brownell had misread the men he was 
appointing. Instead, Eisler faults the nature of the appointment process and the very 
essence of the vetting process, however superficial it might have been.  
According to Eisler, Eisenhower and Brownell may not have been entirely at 
fault. In those days, Supreme Court appointments did not have the partisan taint 
they later acquired, and it was not common practice for presidents to look into the 
political ideologies of their judicial nominees. 288  Though F.D.R. had placed an 
emphasis on selecting judges who shared his progressive views, he had only done so 
after encountering an exceptionally activist Court, hell-bent on striking down his 
signature New Deal policies and programs. Since then, the Court had been relatively 
passive, it held somewhat of a lower profile, and was therefore deemed less political. 
Thus, Eisenhower did not think it vitally important to consider the views of his early 
appointments, and, historically, Eisenhower’s insistence that his prospective 
nominees only be good, upstanding, middle-of-the-road type men was by no means 
unusual.  
But why should focusing on the character of prospective nominees have 
precluded the taking into account of their political ideologies? Perhaps Eisenhower 
had a more old-fashioned view of an apolitical judiciary, one in which he put the 
Court on a pedestal and the political views of prospective judges were thereby 
illegitimate considerations. At the outset of his presidency, he certainly believed 
judges ought to be independent, and their views, irrelevant, though this was 
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something he would later regret. Confiding in his diary upon the death of Chief 
Justice Vinson, he wrote that the “prestige of the Supreme Court had suffered 
severely in late years, and that the only way it could be restored was by the 
appointment of nationwide reputation, integrity, competence in the law, and 
statesmanship.”289 Evidently, he believed the Court’s image had been badly bruised 
during its political skirmishes with F.D.R. in the 1930’s, and through the public 
feuding of Justices Black and Jackson, and he needed to restore prestige to the 
Supreme Court by returning it to its traditional nonpolitical and respected role. 
Thus, it would have been against his governing philosophy to look into the political 
views of the men he was interested in nominating to the Court. 
Or perhaps, like so many other aspects of his presidency, his approach to 
judicial appointments was informed by his prior military experience. Coming from 
the armed forces, which was an entirely an apolitical environment, it was natural for 
him to select men whom he felt were honest and forthright individuals. His 
experience had prevented him from taking anything else account and he had grown 
accustomed to selecting subordinates solely on the basis of objective merit, meaning 
mostly character.  Insofar as Eisenhower could look a man in the eye and get a sense 
that he was honest, forthright, and respectable, he was a suitable nominee. Even if 
he knew their views and did not necessarily agree with them, as the case may very 
well should have been with Brennan, Eisenhower would not have believed that this 
alone should disqualify them from serving on the Supreme Court.  
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Though many are familiar with the oft-quoted Eisenhower remark about his 
two biggest mistakes sitting on the Court, to date, there has been only one credible 
source attributing the quote to the President, found in the diaries of Justice Harold 
Burton. Justice Burton visited the White House in July, 1958, to inform Eisenhower 
of his intent to retire, citing his recent diagnosis of Parkinson’s disease. According to 
Burton’s handwritten diaries, a bewildered Eisenhower expressed disappointment 
at the decisions of Warren and Brennan. With respect to Brennan, he admitted that 
he had erred in appointing a man about whom he knew so little and that in naming a 
replacement for Burton, ideology would play an important part.290 Burton wrote, 
“The president said he wanted a conservative attitude.”291 This marked the first time 
Eisenhower ever emphasized that a prospective nominee ought to possess a certain 
preferred judicial philosophy, and therefore, according to Eisler, and I am compelled 
to conclude the same, when Eisenhower referred to Warren and Brennan as 
“mistakes,” he only meant that he was mistaken for not considering the ideologies of 
the men.292  
Worth mentioning is that Brownell, the so-called politically savvy operator, 
never seemed to correct Eisenhower’s approach to nominating justices to the 
Supreme Court. Why had he not educated Eisenhower on the need to consider the 
philosophies of his judges? Perhaps, he too, subscribed to this old-fashioned idea of 
the Court as a nonpolitical entity. Or perhaps, Brownell never quite had any problem 
with the political views of the men he suggested to begin with. After all, as attorney 
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general, he had a rather moderate to liberal record on race relations and civil rights, 
having orchestrated Eisenhower’s response to the Little Rock school crisis.293 To 
suggest that Brownell was somehow disappointed with the Court’s lurch to the left 
in terms of civil rights implies that he was more conservative than he really was.  
Brownell had been a Dewey supporter all his life, and after his man had lost 
two presidential campaigns, he knew that he had to enlist Eisenhower to run in 
1952 as a moderate Eastern Establishment alternative to the conservative Taft. As 
governor of New York, Dewey signed into law the first ban on race discrimination in 
employment.294 Surely, Dewey and, in turn, Brownell, both of whom were key 
figures in the “Draft Ike” movement, were more progressive on civil rights than 
perhaps they let on, and there is little reason to believe that they would have wanted 
to stop the trend towards racial integration. However, even if Brownell may have 
accepted the Court’s liberal shift on civil rights, it is likely that neither he nor 
Eisenhower would have been open to the more liberal and controversial decisions 
of the Warren Court on issues such as school prayer, Miranda warnings, and 
legislative reapportionment.  
To return to the traditional factors that are considered in judicial 
appointments, we had looked at electoral and partisan goals, shared philosophical 
views, personal friendship, objective merit, and the desire to have the Court’s 
membership mirror or represent the general population, in terms of geography, 
religion, and sometimes race and gender. Eisenhower seems to have neglected one 
of the most important considerations when making appointments to the Supreme 
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Court. In appointing Warren, he assigned to him an exceptionally high objective 
merit. He greatly respected the governor and saw a lot of himself in the man. By 
appointing Brennan, he exaggerated the electoral value of the act, thinking that by 
selecting him, he was contributing to his reelection in 1956. In both instances, it was 
not necessarily the case that Eisenhower undervalued the significance attached to 
naming judges to the Supreme Court. Rather, it was his naiveté that prohibited him 
from allowing Brownell to take into account the philosophies of prospective 
nominees. He relied on certain criteria or factors at the expense of the most 
important one—philosophical affinities between the nominator and the nominee—
and for this, he paid a heavy price.  
 With President Barack Obama’s recent inauguration, he appears poised to 
begin his second term, in which it is all but certain that he will be able to make his 
third appointment to the Supreme Court. Justice Ginsberg will soon be celebrating 
her eightieth birthday and the chances are good that she will choose to retire with a 
Democrat in the White House. Previously, Obama appointed two women to the 
Supreme Court, Justice Kagan, who had previously been his Solicitor General, and 
Justice Sotomayor, who was elevated to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit by President Clinton in 1997. Both have consistently counted themselves 
among the Court’s liberal wing, their views squarely in line with those of their 
nominator. Judging from his prior success with judicial appointments, which one 
would surmise is due, in large part, to the president’s legal background, we can 
expect that Obama will choose a replacement for Justice Ginsberg who shares his 
moderately progressive political philosophy.  
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As we have seen, President Eisenhower did not experience such successes 
with the men he nominated to serve on the Supreme Court, and as previously noted, 
the likely explanation is that neither of the justices were mistakes, but rather that 
Eisenhower’s entire approach to the appointment process was a mistake. Evidently, 
it was not that Eisenhower did not care enough about the Court. To the contrary, he 
cared so deeply about the Court that he refused to taint his appointments with the 
ideological partisanship that had come to be characteristic of his predecessors. He 
greatly valued an independent judiciary with renewed prestige that was comprised 
of honest men—men who reminded Eisenhower of himself. Though he may have 
been motivated by electoral goals, as was the case with Brennan, he felt comfortable 
offering him the job after a twenty minute meeting, in which he was able to get a 
sense of his character. Once he had that, everything else, he thought, would fall into 
place.  
In hindsight, it seems foolish for Eisenhower to have taken the position that 
the political views of his nominees were irrelevant, and thus not worthy of proper 
investigation. Maybe, this is clear to us today only because history has proven what 
becomes of presidents who fail to take such considerations into account. Ever since 
the controversial decisions of the Warren Court, far greater attention has been given 
to the views of judicial nominees. The tumultuous confirmation hearings of Abe 
Fortas, Harrold Carswell, Robert Bork, and Clarence Thomas come to mind. 
Certainly, if it were not for the Warren and Brennan appointments, the records of 
these nominees might not have attracted the same level of scrutiny that they did in 
the post-Warren Court world.  
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Similarly, the vetting processes that are typically in place today for judicial 
nominees have undergone dramatic changes in the wake of some game-changing 
developments. Firstly, the Senate has become increasingly active in its advice and 
consent role in the past several decades, presumable stemming from the highly 
activist years of the Warren Court. Secondly, with the advent of mass media and 
twenty-four hour news cycles, the views of nominees have become magnified to a 
certain extent that it is no longer possible for presidents to ignore them when 
canvassing prospective nominees. Eisenhower certainly did not have these 
additional external incentives to investigate the views of his nominees, for as 
previously noted, the Senate had become passive on such matters, and the media did 
not enjoy as much influence as it does today. Therefore, to a certain degree, 
Eisenhower’s passive approach to investigating the political views of the men he 
appointed was a result of the political climate he presided over—one in which there 
was no great incentive for presidents to heavily vet prospective nominees. 
In sum, it was not that the men he appointed to the Supreme Court were 
failures or mistakes, but rather it was his reliance on the character of his nominees 
and not their philosophies, that was the real mistake. Likewise, it was not 
necessarily the case that Eisenhower did not care about the Court or that he 
underestimated the significance; it was just the he cared about the wrong things. He 
overemphasized factors that were not as consequential as he may have thought, and 
he overlooked aspects of the decision that, today, are almost all we seem to focus on. 
Returning to the present day, one can be sure that when President Obama begins 
the search for a prospective judicial nominee, if he has not done so already, he will 
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make certain to ascertain the political views of whomever he decides to select. If 
there is anything that can be learned from the Eisenhower appointments, it just 
might be that. Thus, a warning to President Obama from the lessons of the 
Eisenhower presidency, “caveat emptor,” buyer beware.  
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